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Abstract
Tiebout Sorting and Jurisdictional Homogeneity: 
Empirical Validity and Ethical Implications 
by 
Lee Hachadoorian 
Advisor: Professor Jochen Albrecht 
In a seminal paper, Tiebout (1956) argues that a large number of 
small local governments will function as a market in local services, 
leading to efficient allocation of local public goods. This result only 
obtains if households actually move in response to local fiscal 
differences. Spatial dependence of socioeconomic variables confounds 
attempts to infer Tiebout-motivated residential choice from observed 
socioeconomic homogeneity. I correct for this by focusing on 
socioeconomic difference across local government borders. In an 
investigation of socioeconomic sorting in Queens and Nassau Counties, 
NY, I find strong evidence of income sorting at the level of small 
suburban municipalities and of racial sorting across school districts. 
There is no evidence of income sorting across school districts, which I 
attribute to NYS school districts’ lack of control over zoning. 
This study design exploits the incongruent boundaries of 
municipalities and school districts in New York State. In neighboring 
v
New Jersey, school districts are by law coterminous with municipalities. 
I hypothesize that, where boundaries are coterminous, sorting by 
school district and municipality will be mutually reinforcing. This 
hypothesis is tested in a comparison of income and racial 
heterogeneity in Nassau County, NY, with Bergen County, NJ, both 
suburban commuter counties within the New York MSA. Sorting is not 
found to be higher in Bergen than in Nassau. These negative results 
imply that the argued advantages of coterminous boundaries in terms 
of citizen oversight (Schwartz 2001) need not be traded off against 
increased segregation. 
I conclude with a discussion of the scope of public services that may 
be allocated via the Tiebout mechanism. Education is a primary good 
of such importance to well-being and to democracy that a pure system 
of local finance violates Rawlsian principles of justice (Rawls 1971). If 
good reasons exist, in terms of efficiency and/or democratic 
participation, for supporting local control in public goods with such 
significant distributive impacts, equalizing transfers are necessary to 
achieve just outcomes. This policy of equalizing transfers is consistent 
both with a spatialized Rawlsian theory of justice, as well as with the 
welfare economist’s concept of efficiency (Schwab, Oates 1991). 
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1 Introduction
1.1 The Public Goods Problem
A central problem in the provision of public goods is accommodating 
taxpayers’ varying levels of demand. For a private good like french 
fries or televisions, the consumption choices of one person are not 
constrained by the choices made by others. I may choose to eat more 
french fries than you, or fewer. But the person who wishes to consume 
more of a public good like parkland is constrained to consume 
whatever level is agreed to by the community. Public goods are in this 
sense jointly consumed. Public goods are also defined as 
nonexcludable, which means that it is difficult or impossible to control 
access to the good. The textbook example is a lighthouse, since the 
light of the lighthouse cannot be restricted to shine on only some ships 
(nonexcludability), and one ship using the lighthouse does not leave 
less light for other ships (joint consumption). Samuelson (1954) 
claimed that no decentralized market or voting system could 
determine the optimal level of a public good. Samuelson argued that, 
since voters can all enjoy the same uniform level of the public good no 
matter how much they have paid in taxes (by the definition of a public 
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good), they have no incentive to reveal their preferences for the public 
good, information which is necessary to arrive at the optimal allocation 
decision. 
One answer to this conundrum is the fiscal sorting model that 
begins with Charles Tiebout’s “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures”, 
an influential 1956 paper that as of January 2011 had 2,454 citations in 
the Social Sciences Citation Index (Tiebout 1956). Developing his 
theory in response to Samuelson, Tiebout counters that for local public 
goods—i.e., public goods whose effects are confined to a small 
geographic area—the public goods consumer must reveal their 
preferences by actually living in the community that best matches 
their preferences. Since preferences are revealed in the residential 
location decision, the optimal level of public good provision can be 
determined. This outcome requires some assumptions, such as 
costless mobility, a large number of communities to select from, and 
full knowledge of taxes and services on the part of rational, utility-
maximizing consumers. Considering its genesis as a counter to 
Samuelson’s claim that no voting system could achieve the optimal 
result, Tiebout’s fiscally induced mobility is often referred to as “voting 
with one’s feet”. The end result is homogeneous communities where 
all residents are getting exactly what they want, and public service 
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provision will be efficient. 
This conclusion might seem harmless if households of similar 
financial resources sorted into communities based on arbitrary 
differences in taste, such as wanting a community with more public 
museums versus wanting a community with more public parks. But the 
ability of the consumer household to realize its preferences is of course 
limited by income. Since microeconomic theory and common sense 
indicate that the wealthy will consume more than the poor, this 
consumer choice view of residential location implies that high-income 
and low-income households will stratify into high-consumption and low-
consumption communities. High-income communities will purchase 
more or better public services (e.g., more acres of parkland, better 
public education) than lower-income communities, and this is backed 
up empirically (Inman 1979). If Tiebout is correct that this outcome is 
efficient, the model encourages complacency with regard to both 
income segregation and the public service differentials associated with 
this spatial inequality. 
Despite an entry in the Dictionary of Human Geography, 4th Ed. 
(Johnston et al. 2000), and coverage in recent urban geography 
textbooks (Kaplan et al. 2004, Pacione 2005), Tiebout sorting has been 
little commented on by geographers (but see Harvey 1973, Clark 1981, 
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Whiteman 1983, Johnston 1984). Searches of academic databases turn 
up articles in journals of economics, political science, and urban affairs. 
Several citations appear in articles in the journal Political Geography 
dealing with metropolitan fragmentation, but these citations appear 
pro forma. 
This apparent indifference to a model which “stands dominant” in 
urban political economy (John, Dowding & Biggs 1995: 379) persists 
despite the relevance of the Tiebout model to areas of inquiry to which 
geographers have contributed. To take one example, the Tiebout 
literature has developed largely independently of the residential 
mobility literature (Kay, Marsh 2007). Geographers who have been 
asked to comment on preliminary research for this project have said 
that the reasons for household relocation documented in the 
residential mobility literature—life cycle (birth of children, 
marriage/divorce, retirement, etc.), class sorting, racial or ethnic 
clustering or avoidance (Rossi 1980)—must dominate fiscal sorting, if 
fiscal sorting is even happening at all. Conversely, the Tiebout 
literature has tended to take socioeconomic homogeneity as evidence 
for fiscal sorting without accounting for sorting due to life cycle, etc. 
While either position might happen to be more nearly correct, neither 
position is tenable absent dialogue between the residential mobility 
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literature and the Tiebout literature. More generally, Tiebout’s theory 
and the public choice model which underlies it must be taken seriously 
if we as geographers are to study urban spatial development, 
segregation, suburbanization and sprawl, urban inequality, 
environmental justice, and other processes which may be influenced 
by fiscal sorting. We must understand and quantify the relative 
significance of fiscal choice among other choice variables. 
The Tiebout model generates claims regarding empirical validity, 
economic efficiency, and policy. Empirically, researchers have been 
interested in whether the assumptions of the model are met, and in 
particular whether evidence supports Tiebout’s initial claim that 
households do in fact move in response to fiscal considerations. 
Regarding efficiency it is claimed that the sorting outcome cannot be 
improved upon. That is, the outcome is a Pareto optimum, a situation 
in which no household can be made better off without making another 
household worse off. Policy implications take the form of making sure 
that the assumptions of the model are met. In particular, the Tiebout 
model assumes the existence of a variety of communities for 
households to choose among, and Tiebout (1956) and later papers 
have therefore opposed metropolitan consolidation. 
In subsequent chapters, this dissertation addresses the empirical 
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validity of fiscal sorting as a factor in residential location, as well as the 
ethical implications of such sorting. First, I address the justice of a 
Tiebout landscape, with particular emphasis on urban-suburban 
inequality. In examining the geographic literature on social justice, I 
move from Rawls’ influential theory of justice (Rawls 1971) to Harvey’s 
early and underdeveloped “general characterization” of territorial 
social justice (Harvey 1973) to the recent flourishing of interest in 
“spatial justice” (Soja 2010). Two empirical chapters follow, addressing 
the question of whether households engage in fiscal sorting. I develop 
a new method of linking geographic homogeneity of household 
characteristics to the Tiebout mechanism. Comparing a fragmented 
suburban county and a unified central city county, I find empirical 
support for the claim that income and race influence the household’s 
choice of local government, with income influencing choice of 
municipality and race influencing school district choice. Comparing 
suburban counties in different states, I then ask whether 
socioeconomic segregation is higher where different kinds of local 
governments are coterminous, e.g. where school districts borders are 
the same as the borders of general purpose municipalities. A 
concluding chapter ties together the empirical and ethical analyses 
with comments on educational finance and a discussion of the value of 
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the Tiebout model. 
1.2 Empirical Investigation of the Tiebout Hypothesis
As discussed earlier, Tiebout (1956) presents a “pure theory” that 
assumes certain behavior on the part of consumer-voters, but does not 
investigate whether these assumptions are met. Dowding and John 
(1994) survey over 200 studies that seek to empirically (dis)confirm 
the Tiebout hypothesis. They divide these studies into city-size 
interpretations, homogeneity interpretations, capitalization studies, 
studies of fiscally induced migration, and micro-level studies. City-size 
studies investigate the implications that smaller jurisdictions and more 
jurisdictions per capita in a metropolitan area are associated with (a) 
greater resident satisfaction with local government and local public 
services, (b) greater competition between jurisdictions, and (c) lower 
per capita expenditure—and therefore less waste—by local 
governments. The general conclusion of Dowding and John is that there 
is evidence for (a), no evidence for (b), and that it is wholly 
inappropriate to use expenditure as a proxy for efficiency as is done by 
previous investigations of (c). I leave off further discussion, as my 
empirical work will address household behavior rather than productive 
efficiency. As I will develop a new homogeneity test of the Tiebout 
model, I will discuss homogeneity interpretations last and in greater 
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detail, while relying primarily on Dowding and John (1994) for 
discussion of the other categories of empirical study. 
Capitalization studies look at the impact of taxes and public services 
on property values. In theory homebuyers should be less willing to pay 
for a house with a high tax burden (negative capitalization) while more 
willing to pay for a house with desired locational features including 
public services enjoyed by virtue of residence, such as education 
(positive capitalization). Using aggregate data Oates (1969) regresses 
median home values on communities’ housing and neighborhood 
characteristics, effective property tax rates, and educational spending 
per pupil. Studies following this general approach are legion, though 
many use microdata (often real estate sales data) rather than 
aggregate data (such as median home value), and recent studies use 
microdata to focus on difference in home prices across jurisdictional 
boundaries (Black 1999, Bayer, Ferreira & McMillan 2007, Thorsnes, 
Reifel 2007). Oates (1969) is also influential in redirecting attention to 
the Tiebout model: following its publication, citations of Tiebout (1956) 
explode. 
What exactly the finding of capitalization means in relation to the 
Tiebout hypothesis is unclear. While there is broad consensus within 
urban economics that tax differentials and service differentials within a 
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metropolitan area are in fact capitalized into home prices, the Tiebout 
model seems to require tax capitalization and service capitalization to 
exactly offset each other. Since this implies collinearity in the variables 
measuring taxes and services, such capitalization would be statistically 
invisible (Ross, Yinger 1999). Thus, if capitalization is found, local taxes 
are not fulfilling the role intended by Tiebout as “prices … of 
community services” (Tiebout 1956: 422), and the sorting cannot be 
efficient. 
Studies of fiscally-induced migration generally use aggregate data 
to determine whether households with given characteristics are more 
or less likely to move to areas with a particular fiscal profile, for 
example, whether lower-income households are more likely to move to 
areas with particularly generous welfare benefits. These studies 
generally focus on interstate or intermetropolitan migration, and are 
therefore less relevant to the current investigation. Dowding and John 
stress that these aggregate level studies of fiscally-induced migration 
are at best corroborative of Tiebout sorting. They argue that 
confirming the existence of Tiebout sorting requires micro-level studies 
which use surveys to specifically query the reasons why households 
say they move. Households must be conscious of of fiscal (tax and 
service) differentials to take advantage of them (indeed, full 
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knowledge is an assumption of the Tiebout model). 
This full knowledge condition is what is under examination in micro-
level studies. Dowding and John go so far as to claim that “[v]alidating 
the Tiebout model requires demonstrating a motivational link between 
tax-service packages and household movement [emphasis added],” 
further arguing that “[t]here has been very little empirical study of 
motivations of people in choosing a community” (Dowding, John 1994: 
§6), a situation which they intend to remedy with “a micro-level test of 
the behavioural assumptions of the Tiebout model” ( the subtitle of 
John, Dowding & Biggs 1995). Their claims seem to have sparked a 
battle over the epistemology of science underlying investigations of 
the Tiebout model (Kay, Marsh 2007, Newton 1997, Dowding, John 
1997, Dowding 2008, Kay, Marsh 2008). Contrary to Kay and Marsh’s 
(2007) claim that the Tiebout literature has been insufficiently 
integrated with the residential mobility literature, John, et al. (John, 
Dowding & Biggs 1995) discuss push and pull factors and address 
family size, job location, and other factors in addition to taxes (viz. the 
poll tax in London boroughs) and services. They find that 43% of 
London movers consider services important as a pull factor. In 
contrast, the American Housing Survey 2007 reveals that, across the 
U.S., only 13% and 5% of households pick “Good schools” and “Other 
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public services” as being a reason at all for their most recent move, 
and only 6% and 1% pick them as the main reason, in both cases lower 
than the categories “Other” and “Not reported”. At the very least, 
these housing and mobility surveys must engender some degree of 
skepticism towards the Tiebout model. A question of debate in the 
literature is whether some households choosing a community based on 
tax and service packages may be enough (and how many would be 
enough) to achieve the efficiency outcome that is the central claim of 
the Tiebout model. 
Homogeneity studies test the Tiebout model by investigating the 
implication, already mentioned, that fiscal choice will lead to stratified 
communities. A typical research design is a cross-MSA study which 
tests the relationship between jurisdictional homogeneity and the 
number of local governments. The researchers begin by choosing the 
population characteristics of interest. Since higher-income jurisdictions 
spend more on public services (Inman 1979), household income is a 
frequently investigated characteristic. The researchers then develop a 
homogeneity measure and regress the measure on variables 
representing likely influences. These likely influences include the 
number and size of jurisdictions in the metropolitan area (Dowding, 
John 1994 and citations therein, Pack, Pack 1977, Eberts, Gronberg 
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1981, Ottensmann 1982), as well as factors expected to interfere with 
the Tiebout mechanism, such as state aid to local governments (Stein 
1987). If Tiebout sorting is taking place, greater jurisdictional choice is 
anticipated to lead to greater homogeneity in the investigated 
characteristics. 
Dowding and John argue that these studies are broadly “consistent 
with Tiebout, but…not truly corroborative” (1994:774). In particular, 
they point out the problem of accounting for statistical sorting. Tiebout 
theory predicts that smaller jurisdictions will be more homogeneous 
than larger jurisdictions. But any randomly selected subpopulation is 
statistically likely to show lower variance over a given characteristic 
(i.e., be more homogeneous) than the population from which it is 
selected. Therefore, a homogeneity investigation must distinguish 
Tiebout sorting (the intentional grouping of households with similar 
characteristics) from this statistical artifact. Following Dowding and 
John, research design has moved away from the use of cross-MSA 
regressions, and instead tests for statistical significance of observed 
municipal homogeneity within single MSAs (Heikkila 1996, Bickers, 
Engstrom 2006). 
I argue that homogeneity tests of the Tiebout model face an even 
more severe challenge due to the spatial dependence of 
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sociodemographic data. The statistical sorting problem applies to 
independent samples. But if households locate near other households 
with similar characteristics, a subset selected within a contiguous 
geographic area will not be an independent sample, and will be even 
more homogeneous than a subset selected at random from across the 
MSA. This could lead to misattribution of the socioeconomic 
characteristics being sorted and/or the geography being sorted over. 
For example, households might sort by religion without regard to 
political boundaries, yet because of spatial dependence religious 
homogeneity would be found at the level of the political jurisdiction. 
Households might sort based on public services provided by one kind 
of government, such as school district, but homogeneity would also be 
found at the level of the municipality. While this is obvious for the case 
where school districts and municipalities are coextensive, it also 
applies when municipal and school district boundaries are not 
coextensive (provided municipalities are not too much larger than 
school districts). In short, existing approaches will tend to find sorting 
at whatever geographic unit is selected for study, with no necessary 
relationship to the Tiebout mechanism. 
Nonetheless, I attempt to resurrect homogeneity investigations of 
Tiebout relying on aggregate data, primarily because the availability of 
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aggregate data allows research to proceed at low cost, with ease of 
replication, and with ease of comparison across time and space. While 
micro-level studies may demonstrate the link between tax-service 
packages and household behavior, survey data is not always 
preferable to aggregate data when they are in conflict. For example, in 
studying aversion to majority Black neighborhoods, Harris (2001) 
avoids asking survey respondents their attitude toward racial 
integration in order to avoid “socially modified responses,” and instead 
uses neighborhood composition from the U.S. Census. Interestingly, I 
find this to be consistent with Tiebout’s original claim that household 
location in space reveals preference in a way that mere survey (i.e. 
voting) can obscure. I argue that homogeneity studies of the Tiebout 
hypothesis can be corroborative when the method excludes other 
explanations of observed sorting. Therefore, rather than use 
homogeneity within jurisdictions (as have previous investigations), I 
focus on heterogeneity across jurisdictional boundaries. This has some 
similarities with the border discontinuity design used in the 
capitalization literature. I argue that socioeconomic stratification 
across boundaries can be indicative of fiscal sorting if the degree of 
stratification is greater than that between neighborhoods that do not 
straddle jurisdictional boundaries. 
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Thus, in Chapter 3 I present results of a study of jurisdictional 
homogeneity in New York State’s Queens and Nassau counties, one 
county being part of a jurisdictionally unified central city, the other a 
jurisdictionally fragmented suburban county. I find strong empirical 
support for income stratification across suburban municipalities. Across 
suburban school districts I find ambiguous evidence regarding income 
stratification, but strong support for racial stratification. This result 
relies upon the fact that municipal and school district borders do not in 
general coincide with each other. In contrast, in New Jersey, school 
districts are by law coextensive with municipalities. In Chapter 4 I 
investigate heterogeneity across jurisdictional boundaries in a 
comparison of counties between New York State and New Jersey, 
focusing on the suburban counties of the New York–Northern New 
Jersey–Long Island CMSA. While it seems plausible to hypothesize that 
Northern New Jersey would exhibit stronger income and racial 
stratification as households jointly select a municipality and a school 
district of residence, the investigation does not support the hypothesis.
1.3 Equity in a Tiebout World
The empirical investigation of this dissertation will support the claim 
that households do sort into Tiebout-consistent landscapes. While 
supporters of metropolitan decentralization will take this as good news, 
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John, et al., point out that the policy implications are ambiguous. Their 
conclusion is worth quoting at length: 
Supporters of Tiebout, aware of its empirical corroboration, 
would thus recommend fragmented government to 
encourage Tiebout effects. Those who are more concerned 
with welfare or egalitarian objectives, believing in the efficacy 
of redistributional taxes, may take an opposed policy stance. 
To the extent that fragmented government leads households 
towards jurisdictions with the lowest tax burden, and this 
drives local governments to impose lower taxes in order to 
attract households, the result is cheaper and fewer services. 
This does not entail Pareto-efficiency, merely different levels 
and types of services, which confuses the ability of citizens to 
compare local governments and makes the idea of increasing 
choice problematic. Our results suggest the consequence 
would be fewer services since lower taxes rather than better 
services seem to motivate more movers. In the absence of 
full needs and resources central grant equalization, fiscal 
migration would lead to large inequalities between 
jurisdictions and impose heavy tax burdens on citizens who 
live in poorer areas. Thus, whilst our findings have important 
policy implications, the lessons to be drawn will be 
normatively driven by prior political commitments. Contrary 
to what most supporters and opponents of Tiebout seem to 
believe, the truth of the Tiebout model does not, on its own, 
offer lessons for the organization of local government. (John, 
Dowding & Biggs 1995:396-7, emphasis mine) 
Their view is a necessary corrective, though it would be strange to 
suggest—and perhaps I read in too much to think they suggest—that 
one’s political commitments are not influenced by empirical analysis. 
But clearly they are right about the importance of the normative 
dimension. To this end, I devote a chapter to equity in a Tiebout world. 
This chapter assumes a particular outcome of the empirical 
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investigation, specifically that household sorting is at least partially 
driven by fiscal choice, enough so that the sorting landscape that 
emerges is consistent with actual household preferences. Further, at 
this stage of the investigation, the efficiency claim that is central to the 
Tiebout model is not interrogated. Assuming, then, that Tiebout sorting 
is occurring and is efficient, I investigate the equity or justice of the 
sorting outcome in a geographical context. Tiebout (1956) addresses 
choice among small municipalities, a landscape typical of 
jurisdictionally fragmented American suburbs. But Tiebout choice can 
also be exercised over collections of socioeconomically similar 
localities, such as the choice between city and suburb. White flight or 
flight-from-blight can be seen as a special case of Tiebout choice 
(Mieszkowski, Mills 1993), and persistent inequality between cities and 
their suburbs make what might be referred to as the intrametropolitan 
scale important for an investigation of spatial equity. More recently it 
has been argued that “Tiebout-like exclusion” also can be found wholly 
within a single jurisdiction, such as the the unified jurisdiction of a 
central city (Lynch, Rasmussen 2004). The Tiebout model was also 
extended to encompass subnational migration (i.e., fiscal choice 
among states) by Tullock (1971). This so-called Tiebout-Tullock model 
has been investigated by Cebula (2009 and references cited therein). 
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While households may very well take state-level taxes and services 
into account in the location decision, interstate moves involve changes 
in employment and social networks that go well beyond the spirit of 
the Tiebout model as originally proposed. While interesting, this 
represents a distinct set of research questions which I do not engage in 
this dissertation. 
The substantive focus of the Tiebout model is the balance of taxes 
and services in local jurisdictions. I will argue, however, that this fiscal 
milieu is difficult in practice to separate from other aspects of the 
social and physical environment. Surveys such as the American 
Housing Survey and John, et al. (1995), indicate that people choose 
neighborhoods/jurisdictions for a variety of competing reasons. Given a 
household decision-making process which takes into account not only 
the Tiebout-type fiscal calculus but also various aspects of the natural, 
built, and social environment, the question with regard to equity is 
whether and how this household decision-process creates or reinforces 
inequality, and how these various dimensions of household choice 
create or reinforce inequality along other dimensions. In the chapter on 
equity in a Tiebout landscape, I will further develop the relationship 
among the various dimensions of the local environment that motivate 
household choice. It is to the possible frameworks for evaluating equity 
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that I now turn. 
Distributive justice was foregrounded by John Rawls’ pathbreaking A 
Theory of Justice (1971), a work whose influence cannot be overstated. 
A Theory of Justice revitalized an Anglo-American philosophy which for 
much of the 20th century had concerned itself primarily with 
conceptual analysis of meaning and language, and had abdicated its 
historical role in ethical and political inquiry. Rawls concerned himself 
with the long-standing question within Western political philosophy of 
the tension between liberty and equality, while challenging a degraded 
form of utilitarian thought which had worked its way into policy 
analysis via economics (Nussbaum 2001). 
While a fuller exposition of Rawls’ theory will be presented later, 
perhaps the most widely cited element of his theory is what he calls 
the difference principle. This principle states that “[s]ocial and 
economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are … to the 
greatest benefit of the least advantaged” (Rawls 1971: 266). While 
arguing from a generally Kantian position emphasizing individual 
liberty, Rawls’ difference principle allows for a significant degree of 
redistribution, which he believes to be compatible with either socialism 
or a welfarist market-economy. 
Rawls’ theory has been criticized on libertarian grounds (Nozick 
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1974) and Marxian grounds (Miller 1975). It has been criticized for 
paying insufficient attention to identity-based political movements, and 
to the place of “difference” in culture and political decision-making 
(Young 1990). The geographer Gordon L. Clark has criticized the theory 
for the lack of social context in the original position (Clark 1986) and 
for its inherent individualism (1983, where he nonetheless attempts to 
develop a national policy for regional development that is consistent 
with the spirit of Rawls’ theory). Some of these challenges, such as the 
libertarian and Marxian, are radical, by which I mean that if they are 
successful, Rawls theory is left defeated. Other challenges have been 
answered by Rawls in later work. For example, Clark’s challenge to the 
theory’s lack of social context may be partially met by Rawls adjusting 
the theory to account for “reasonable pluralism” in Political Liberalism 
(Rawls 1993). And some approaches, such as incorporating the politics 
of difference, may be seen as complementary to Rawls’ (near 
exclusive) emphasis on distribution (Schlosberg 2007). My focus will be 
on spatial complications to the theory in the urban context. 
The first attempt toward a spatially contextualized theory of justice 
based on Rawls’ theory was David Harvey’s Social Justice and the City 
(1973: Ch. 3). While the influence of A Theory of Justice extended far 
beyond philosophy, Social Justice and the City was perhaps as 
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influential within the narrower confines of the related disciplines of 
geography, urban planning, and regional science. In it, we see Harvey 
moving beyond the classical location theory in which he was trained 
toward a wider engagement with the concerns of poverty, inequality, 
class, and political power. Harvey argues that in various ways, urban 
form is organized to redistribute income in anti-egalitarian ways. In 
moving beyond a a bare concern with the spatiality of service provision 
that characterizes Davies’ concept of territorial justice, Harvey makes 
use of Rawls’ theory to propose an updated set of principles for a 
“territorial social justice” that is sensitive to the spatialized nature of 
production. Harvey proposes a spatialized difference principle: “The 
mechanisms (institutional, organizational, political and economic) 
should be such that the prospects of the least advantaged territory are 
as great as they possibly can be” (Harvey 1973: 116-117). 
However, in considering central city/suburban inequality, Harvey is 
pessimistic about achieving territorial social justice under the capitalist 
mode of production. Consider the problem of central city 
disinvestment. Under capitalism it is rational for capital to flow to the 
territory with the highest rate of return. The return on investment of 
inner city housing is lower than it would need to be to attract capital 
from alternative investment in suburban housing. But liberal solutions 
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to this problem which might focus on subsidizing (Harvey says 
“bribing”) financial institutions to invest in inner city housing will have 
the effect of raising what suburban developers are willing to bid for 
access to capital. Overall and in all territories the return to capital will 
increase, while the spatial outcome desired may very well be 
subverted. “Thus there appears to be a built-in tendency for the 
capitalist market system to counteract any attempt to divert the flow 
of funds away from the most profitable territories” (Harvey 1973: 113). 
These considerations and others lead Harvey to conclude that “the 
market mechanism is automatically antagonistic to any principle of 
social justice” (Harvey 1973: 116). While Rawls sees his analysis as 
consistent with either liberalism or socialism, Harvey believes that 
from Rawls’ original position “it is possible to arrive … at a Marx or a 
Milton Friedman, but in no way can we arrive at the liberal or [market] 
socialist solutions” (Harvey 1973: 109). 
Harvey’s earlier chapters on “Liberal Formulations” therefore give 
way to the later chapters on “Socialist Formulations”. Although Harvey 
claims that “the material content of Part I is not rejected but is 
incorporated and given new meaning by the evolving framework of 
Part 2” (Harvey 1973: 10), later writers have commented that what 
Harvey called a “general characterization” of territorial social justice 
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was essentially dropped by him and the rest of the discipline: “[T]he 
subsequent development of human geography revealed little progress 
in this direction …. So, when Harvey (1996) returned to the subject at 
book length twenty-five years on [in Justice, Nature and the Geography 
of Difference], his central question of ‘the just production of just 
geographical differences’ was virtually the same as before” (Soja 2010, 
Smith 2000a: 137, see also Pirie 1983). 
The idea of a specifically spatial justice has a checkered history. 
Pirie argues that Harvey’s territorial social justice and subsequent 
discussion of justice in geography “calls for no other justice 
judgements than those which can be made in terms of some concept 
of social justice” (Pirie 1983: 470). David M. Smith has perhaps done 
the most to establish connections between geography and ethics, and 
with liberal borrowing from political philosophy and other disciplines he 
situates his investigation of “the place of good fortune” in the tradition 
of Western philosophical interest in moral luck, and the idea that 
people should not be penalized (or rewarded) for arbitrary differences 
(2000a, Smith 1994, 2000b, 2000c). Most recently, urban geographer 
Ed Soja reviews the history of the spatial justice concept and its 
grounded application in Los Angeles in Seeking Spatial Justice (2010). 
Soja notes that until recently geographers have been reticent to even 
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use the phrase spatial justice, and argues that geographers, concerned 
with a disciplinary history of environmental determinism, have been 
reticent to put forward an “assertive spatial perspective” which views 
space not as a mere container for social processes, but as dialectically 
influencing spatially situated social processes. 
Spatial justice, as developed by Soja, is closely related to 
environmental justice. Environmental justice concerns how poor and 
minority communities are disproportionately impacted by such things 
as air pollution, toxic waste facilities, and other anthropogenic 
degradations of the environment. While environmental justice is 
sometimes defined so as to encompass the impacts of social 
environment (Greenberg, Schneider 1996 devotes a chapter to crime 
in Camden, NJ), in agreement with Soja I will treat environmental 
justice as a logical subset of spatial justice. The mechanisms through 
which certain inequities are perpetrated are similar, as disproportional 
impact is only possible if classes and/or races are spatially separated. 
For example, Hurley (1995) describes how, prior to the era of white 
flight, upper-class white executives, middle-class white managers, and 
black and ethnic white laborers in Gary, Indiana’s, dominant industry 
(steel) faced similar environmental conditions, even while living in 
quite distinct neighborhoods within Gary. But the socio-spatial process 
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of suburbanization created a new landscape in which, for a time at 
least, middle- and upper-class whites removed themselves from the 
environmental degradation within the city limits. Pulido (2000) has 
argued that the suburbanization of middle-class whites underlies 
disproportionate exposure to environmental degradation in Los 
Angeles. I will argue that the same socio-spatial processes which lead 
to disproportionate exposure to industrial pollution or toxic waste in 
poor and minority communities also lead to disproportionate access to 
educational resources and other public services. Specifically, an 
historical legacy of housing discrimination has created a self-
perpetuating system in which neighborhoods with poor schools and 
unhealthy environs repel middle-class households while at the same 
time severely constraining the life chances of the current residents. 
In support of the idea of environmental justice as a component of a 
broader, spatial justice, note that the legal pursuit of environmental 
equity and educational equity share a similar jurisprudential history. 
Both the environmental justice movement and the educational equity 
movement have had to deal with the difficulty of proving 
discriminatory intent. Both have pursued theoretically easier-to-prove 
disparate impact claims, allowed by the implementing regulations of 
federal civil rights law (Title VI and occasionally Title VIII Fair Housing 
25
Chapter 1
Act). Both have generally fought against state and local governments 
and regulatory agencies—in the educational equity cases because the 
governments are the producers of education, while in environmental 
justice cases because the governments are being accused of granting 
permits or enacting policies that benefit private producers, e.g. a 
company seeking a permit for a a waste facility. Both environmental 
and educational equity claims have had to deal with a jurisprudential 
shift making it increasingly difficult to pursue civil rights claims, and in 
particular with the elimination of a private right to sue over alleged 
Title VI violations (Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001)). 
Soja further compares the relative privileging of time over space, of 
history over geography, and argues that social processes must be 
understood from a perspective that is simultaneously historical and 
geographical. Similarly, I will argue that Rawls’ theory, which 
addresses distribution across time (generations of persons), must also 
address distribution across space: both of natural resource 
endowments, as discussed by Smith and by some political philosophers 
(Smith 2000c, Pogge 2002), as well as of the concentrations of 
economic activity (agglomerations) that define cities themselves. I 
therefore propose a modification of Rawls’ principles of justice, 
examine the relationship between Rawls’ theory and federalism, and 
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argue for the compatibility of a suitably constrained Tiebout model 
with a spatialized Rawlsian justice.
1.4 Constructing a Just Tiebout Landscape
Empirical and normative investigation must support each other. The 
Tiebout model is a “pure theory” which, like the neoclassical market 
model it is derived from, relies upon an implicit empirical claim about 
human behavior and an implicit normative claim about the value of 
Pareto efficiency. If empirically we fail to find that households make 
Tiebout-consistent location decisions, the efficiency claims of the 
model are vitiated. Similarly, if we conclude that Pareto efficiency is 
normatively subordinate to equity claims, the empirical findings cannot 
justify the Tiebout model—they can only serve as evidence in our 
policy-making. And, just as a study of the sociology of crime would be 
used to try to reduce rather than to justify crime, the finding of fiscal 
sorting by households might be used as evidence in crafting a policy to 
interfere with fiscal choice, if that is what our normative convictions 
demand. 
The final question then is what kinds of goods should be distributed 
via the Tiebout mechanism? Consider educational finance, which has 
been important to the Tiebout literature because it comprises the 
largest part of American local government expenditure. Numerous 
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studies document the impact of school test scores on housing prices, 
indicating that households value and are willing to pay for better 
school performance (Black 1999, Bayer, Ferreira & McMillan 2007, 
Bogart, Cromwell 1997, Barrow 2002). Tiebout choice may be 
promoted as a mechanism for school choice—a commonly suggested 
strategy for improving schools (Hoxby 2000). Against this stand studies 
indicating that parents have little knowledge of actual school 
performance (Buckley, Schneider 2006), and that parents place greater 
emphasis on peer group (especially race) than on school performance 
in their actual residential choices (Rothstein 2004, Hamilton, Guin 
2005). 
This is a complex literature which I will not engage experimentally. 
Rather, I will argue that the Tiebout model can at best provide a post 
hoc justification for a system which was not actually designed as a 
system of school choice. Of major concern is the relationship between 
small, independent school districts and segregation. Metropolitan 
fragmentation increases racial segregation (Woo 2004, Dawkins 2005), 
which has been shown to have deleterious effects on academic 
performance among minority students (Mickelson 2003). My empirical 
finding of greater racial sorting across school districts than across 
other types of local governments, and the mutually reinforcing nature 
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of school segregation and housing segregation (Orfield 1996, Orfield 
1997), strongly suggest that relying on the housing market to 
implement school choice would engender even greater segregation. 
Yet while the harms in terms of increased segregation are clear, 
empirical support for the alleged productivity of smaller school districts 
has been ambiguous (contrast Hoxby 2000, Rothstein 2004). Finally, 
based on my justice analysis, I argue that education is a primary good 
of such importance to well-being and to democracy that tax base 
inequalities make a pure system of local finance unjust. If local control 
is valued, the actual funding must be supplemented, perhaps even 
supplanted, with intergovernmental transfers or a system of central 
financing. One might ask, if school choice can improve school 
productivity and student outcomes via market competition, whether it 
should be implemented directly rather than hitched to the housing 
market. After all, Tiebout’s original conclusion that allocation of public 
goods via local governments “need not take a back seat to [the 
efficiency of] the private sector” (Tiebout 1956: 424) is a far cry from 
arguing that public goods ought to be allocated via local governments 
or ought to be allocated based on residential location when other 
alternatives exist. 
In concluding, I defend a circumscribed view of localism that is 
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motivated more by the political benefits of citizen participation than 
the efficiency effects of the Tiebout model. A certain class of public 
services is ideally, perhaps even necessarily, allocated via the Tiebout 
mechanism. Tiebout’s original paper discussed a fixed public resource
—the example given was the fixed length of a beach. Access to a 
beach must be rationed, while access to education need not be. Given 
the efficiency characteristics of the Tiebout model, residential choice 
remains a reasonable way to distribute access to fixed resources, and 
in analyzing income sorting in Nassau County (Chapter 3) I will suggest 
that households are making decisions based on a crucial suburban 
amenity, viz. low housing density. Other spatially fixed amenities which 
might be allocated via the Tiebout mechanism include natural 
amenities and quasi-permanent capital infrastructure such as roads 
and sewerage. But these efficiency characteristics cannot suffice to 
recommend the distribution of other public services, such as 
education, via residential location. That decision must be made on 
another basis, and if local provision is retained, compensatory funding 
is necessary to assure just outcomes. 
What is most interesting is how, while the Tiebout model has all but 
been used as an apologia for exclusionary zoning and school 
segregation, there is so little diversity in residential living. While the 
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household may choose between urban multi-family apartment 
buildings, inner-suburan attached housing, and outer-suburban 
detached single-family homes, there are many fewer places to go for 
households interested in ecovillages, clustered or car-free suburban 
housing, limited equity cooperative housing, or mixed-age housing that 
incorporates desired care services such as childcare and eldercare. A 
reconstituted Tiebout model should focus on what can effectively and 
ethically be distributed via housing choice—natural amenities and 
parks, infrastructure, density, and design and planning—and on 
encouraging for housing the experimentation that markets are praised 
for providing.
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2 Justice in Space, Spatial Justice, and the 
Structure of Metropolitan Governance
2.1 Introduction
An important criticism of urban fragmentation, and the Tiebout 
model which justifies it, is that it is implicated in the middle-class 
abandonment of central cities that has left these cities as containers of 
concentrated poverty. In 1999, the median household income of all 
central places in the United States was $40,000 and the percent of the 
population living in poverty was 16%, while the median household 
income in the suburbs (the urbanized area not in central places) was 
$51,000 and the percent living in poverty was 8%. For New York City, 
median household income was $38,000 and the percent of the 
population living in poverty was 21%, while the median income in the 
metropolitan area’s suburbs was $66,000 and the percent living in 
poverty was only 6%. (Figures from Census 2000 “Table GCT-P14. 
Income and Poverty in 1999”. Median income rounded to nearest 
thousand, percent in poverty rounded to nearest whole number.) There 
is some disagreement about whether this poor-city/rich-suburbs 
landscape has been produced by a process of “natural evolution” 
32
Chapter 2
driven by decreasing transportation costs and the demand for new 
housing, particularly single-family detached housing, or whether it is a 
“white flight” response to changing urban racial composition or 
deteriorating public services (Mieszkowski, Mills 1993). 
A significant body of literature investigates whether white flight is 
motivated primarily by race (particularly white avoidance of blacks) or 
by central city environmental and fiscal characteristics. While early 
work tended to come down on one side or the other, later work was 
more nuanced, teasing out the effects while admitting that both were 
operative (Krysan 2002). Often the phrase “flight from blight” is used 
(instead of white flight) when focusing on this aspect of central city 
amenities and fiscal health: as higher-income, white households move 
to the suburbs, the deteriorating tax base forces the central city to cut 
back on public services like police and education, leading to a vicious 
circle of flight and deteriorating services. This kind of fiscally motivated 
suburbanization is itself a form of Tiebout choice (Mieszkowski, Mills 
1993). Even though a great deal of inequality exists within suburban 
areas and within central cities, the legal separation between cities and 
suburbs and the persistence of city-suburb inequality make this divide 
especially important in any examination of metropolitan inequality. (It 
is this internal suburban inequality which will be crucial to the 
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empirical analyses of Chapters 3 and 4.)
I begin with a discussion of John Rawls’ influential theory of “justice 
as fairness” (Rawls 1971), followed by a discussion of how urban space 
complicates this theory, and Harvey’s attempt to create principles of 
territorial social justice (Harvey 1973). I then argue for a restatement 
of Rawls’ two principles of justice which takes into account the impact 
of space on distribution. Finally, I return to the Tiebout model and the 
choice of residential location to argue for a basic structure that 
achieves spatial justice while preserving household choice. 
2.2 Distributive Justice
The most significant modern statement of a theory of justice is the 
work of political philosopher John Rawls (1971). Rawls’ method is to 
determine what principles would be endorsed by rational, self-
interested parties who are negotiating the “basic structure” of their 
society from behind a “veil of ignorance”. The basic structure refers 
not only to the governance structure—the constitution and laws of a 
nation-state—but also to the economic structure and social institutions, 
such as family structure. Behind the veil of ignorance, the negotiating 
parties do not know whether they will have any special talents, will be 
male or female, rich or poor, or what religion or ethnic group they 
might belong to. Not knowing this information, Rawls argues that the 
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people in the original position will want to make sure that the worst-off 
roles are as well-off as they can possibly be. This leads him to adopt 
two principles of justice. 
[First Principle:] Each person is to have an equal right to the 
most extensive total system of equal basic liberties 
compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. 
[Second Principle:] Social and economic inequalities are to be 
arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of 
the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings 
principle, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all 
under conditions of fair equality of opportunity (Rawls 1971: 
266). 
These principles are ranked, so that the first principle trumps the 
second principle. Thus, “the basic liberties can be restricted only for 
the sake of liberty,” not for the sake of ameliorating social and 
economic inequalities. Furthermore, within the second principle, (b) 
“fair equality of opportunity” takes precedence over (a) the “difference 
principle”. These principles are those Rawls believes rational self-
interested actors will settle on behind the veil of ignorance; they are to 
guide the adoption of institutions, as well as specific policies, and they 
are to benefit classes of people, rather than specific individuals. The 
first principle will guide the design of political institutions (a political 
constitution), while the second principle will guide the design of social 
and economic institutions (Wenar 2008). 
The adoption and application of the principles can be seen as 
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working in stages, with the veil of ignorance “thinning” in later stages. 
The two principles are adopted in the first stage behind a “thick” veil of 
ignorance. In the second stage, “representatives” create the political 
constitution subject to the first principle and with knowledge of general 
facts about the society, including level of economic development, 
natural resources and environmental conditions, political culture, etc., 
but still with no knowledge of their own class or individual 
endowments. At the third, “legislative” stage, the actors must choose 
specific social and economic policies. These choices are guided by the 
second principle (i.e., the principle that incorporates both the 
difference principle and fair equality of opportunity) in light of all 
economic and social facts. It is only in the fourth stage, that of the 
actual administration of law, that full knowledge of all facts, including 
one’s own personal identity and standing, is allowed (Rawls 1971: §31). 
Both principles of justice take precedence over efficiency. An 
institution which promotes efficiency would not be chosen in the 
original position if it violates either principle of justice. Rawls here 
takes efficiency in the economists’ sense of Pareto efficiency, which 
indicates a distribution where no one can be made better off without 
making someone else worse off. Rawls uses as an example the 
organization of labor. An economy may be feudal (that is, based on 
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serfdom) or it may be premised upon free labor. To change from one to 
the other would involve taking rights away from one class and granting 
rights to another class. Therefore both institutions are efficient in the 
sense that neither can be altered without reducing the prospects of 
some person. But they are not equivalently just. Therefore, another 
principle is needed to choose between them. 
Rawls is most concerned to justify his theory in contrast to 
utilitarianism, and in particular to justify the difference principle in 
contrast to the principle of average utility. If one were to adopt the 
principle of average utility, one would be willing to risk a reduction in 
one’s utility in favor of the likelihood of a greater increase. That is, one 
accepts a decreased lower bound to one’s possible income or status or 
well-being, however so measured, in exchange for a higher average. 
An extreme result of adopting this principle is that the institution of 
slavery would be allowed, if one could demonstrate that allowing 
slavery raised the average utility in the society. Those who have 
adopted the two principles would reject slavery because of the 
violation of both principles. The violation of the first principle of equal 
basic liberties is obvious, but moreover, Rawls argues that people in 
the original position would adopt the second principle over the 
principle of average utility, because they would reject any principle 
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which traded off a risk of a worse lot (slavery) in favor of an average 
improvement. Rawls concedes that it is possible to modify the principle 
of average utility (in the first stage of deliberation) to guarantee that 
slavery is rejected (in the second stage of deliberation) by assuming a 
high degree of risk aversion on the part of those in the original 
position, but he argues that this result is more complicated to arrive at 
and would therefore not be preferred to the more parsimonious 
difference principle. 
Importantly, the difference principle does allow some degree of 
inequality, perhaps even a large degree of inequality, if the proposed 
basic structure improves the lot of the least well-off class. What this 
means is that if a proposed basic structure would increase aggregate 
welfare at the expense of an increase in economic or social inequality, 
that basic structure could nonetheless be adopted if the lot of the 
worst-off were improved. For example, suppose that investing extra 
resources in the education of “the best and the brightest” leads to an 
overall improvement in the standard of living, say because of an 
increase in the rate of innovation. Such disproportionate investment 
will improve the lot of those toward whom the resources are directed, 
possibly increasing inequality. Should a policy such as establishing 
“gifted and talented” programs be adopted? According to the 
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difference principle, the increased inequality in and of itself is not 
disqualifying. But the improved standard of living, if taken as an 
average, is immaterial. What matters is the impact on the worst off. If 
disproportionate investment in establishing gifted and talented 
programs comes at the expense of struggling students, leading to 
worse life prospects for these students, this policy would not be 
adopted. But if the benefits to society were so great that the least 
advantaged students realized an improved standard of living, then the 
policy would be allowable, even if there were an increase in inequality. 
The important conclusion is that social and economic structures are to 
be arranged so as to maximize the expectations of the least well-off 
class. 
2.3 Spatial Complications
Rawls does not address the spatial dimension of inequality and the 
issue of mobility. Rawls framework assumes that the question of 
distributive justice is one that is approached by a people with a shared 
political and ethical history, and is therefore relevant to the issue of 
inequality at a national scale rather than a global or subnational scale. 
Rawls initially sidesteps the issue of global distribution by assuming a 
closed society: people enter and exit the society only by birth or death. 
It has been proposed to extend the difference principle as a principle 
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for rectifying global inequalities (Pogge 2002, Pogge 2005, Beitz 2005)
—a move, incidentally, resisted by Rawls (Rawls 1999). Such an 
extension of the theory would create significant duties on the part of 
the wealthy industrialized countries of the world to aid the less 
developed countries. But whichever way the argument about global 
redistribution should come down, the issue of distributive justice at the 
subnational level is quite distinct. 
Within geography, the focus on internal distribution precedes Rawls. 
The territorial justice framework developed by Bleddyn Davies is 
perhaps the earliest attempt to examine questions of inequality among 
administrative jurisdictions (1968). Territorial justice aims at providing 
services commensurate with need within each administrative unit. As 
such, it is primarily a tool for determining appropriate service-provision 
when the funding authority is centralized. It has therefore had great 
importance within British geography and related disciplines, since 
British local authorities receive their funding from the central 
government (Kay 2005). Without modification, this type of analysis has 
little relationship to the kind of independent local jurisdictions that are 
characteristic of American metropolitan areas, and that the Tiebout 
model envisages. 
Spatial inequality in the urban system was examined in David 
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Harvey’s watershed Social Justice and the City. Harvey argues that 
urban form is organized to redistribute income in anti-egalitarian ways. 
For example, political processes will tend to reward the well-organized 
and well-financed, and usually will reward smaller groups at the 
expense of the majority. Poorer city dwellers will lose out due to job 
growth taking place primarily in the higher-cost-of-living and 
transportation inaccessible suburbs (i.e., the so-called spatial 
mismatch problem (Kain 1968, Kain 2004, Ihlanfeldt, Sjoquist 1998)). 
Differing social and cultural values make it difficult to measure 
preferences and needs among different populations, as well as making 
it technically impossible for Pareto optimal outcomes to emerge. The 
unavoidably location-specific nature of both natural and produced 
amenities make it possible for the wealthy as first movers in a bidding 
process to claim the best locations, while leaving the poor to the least 
desirable locations. Furthermore, if not enough housing is available for 
a given population, the poor may bid very high amounts for the lowest 
quality neighborhoods just to avoid losing the game of housing musical 
chairs (Harvey 1973). 
Harvey goes on to consider the spatial problems of social justice. 
Most of his analysis is concerned with interregional equity. 
Interregional inequality is problematized by the production process in 
41
Chapter 2
space. Due to agglomeration economies, output may increase if an 
industry is allowed to concentrate in a particular region rather than 
split across regions. But if national policy were to lock in the first 
mover advantage of a specific region, how and to what extent are 
other specific regions to be aided in economic development? Harvey 
agrees that efficiency is not to be ignored in the analysis, but too often 
the focus on efficiency amounts to a tacit endorsement of the status 
quo. Harvey, echoing Rawls, proposes two principles of territorial social 
justice (broadening from Davies’ “territorial justice” (1968)): 
•The distribution of income should be such that (a) the needs 
of the population within each territory are met, (b) resources 
are so allocated to maximize interterritorial multiplier effects, 
and (c) extra resources are allocated to help overcome 
special difficulties stemming from the physical and social 
environment. 
•The mechanisms (institutional, organizational, political and 
economic) should be such that the prospects of the least 
advantaged territory are as great as they possibly can be. 
(Harvey 1973: 116-117) 
This focus on interregional equity is pursued by Gordon L. Clark 
(1983). Rawls’ prioritization of justice over efficiency is further 
defended by Clark’s questioning of the very idea of a tradeoff between 
equity and efficiency . Clark specifically investigates the tradeoff 
between national efficiency and regional equity. If efficiency is defined 
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as attaining maximum aggregate wealth for a given set of resources, 
technology, and income distribution, then targeting efficiency at a 
national level could mean ignoring interregional equity. But Clark 
questions why national wealth is to be valued at all. Against the claim 
that national wealth is valuable because of the benefits to regions or 
individuals, Clark counters that clearly not all regions or individuals 
benefit from an increase in national wealth. Thus, some concept of 
social justice is necessary to evaluate the outcomes for regions or 
individuals, and efficiency must be treated as a means to achieve the 
normative goals decided upon. Maximizing national or aggregate 
wealth can be justified by an appeal to utilitarianism, but this is exactly 
the view which Rawls seeks to supplant. Clark goes on to develop 
guidelines for a national urban policy sensitive to Rawls’ difference 
principle, though he is also critical of the inherent individualism of 
Rawls’ approach. 
Returning to Harvey’s principles of territorial social justice, the 
question is how these principles might apply to urban (rather than 
interregional) inequality. As discussed in the first chapter, it is 
consideration of the urban system which leads Harvey to conclude that 
“the market mechanism is automatically antagonistic to any principle 
of social justice” (Harvey 1973: 116). Harvey’s “Liberal Formulations” 
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give way to “Socialist Formulations”, and the socialist chapters of Part 
2 of Social Justice and the City leave many of the specific questions of 
the liberal chapters behind. Incomplete analyses and tentative 
endorsements of Tiebout and Rawls from Part 1 are not reappraised, 
but the reader is left seeing them as inconsistent with Harvey’s later 
analysis. Are they still useful theories, to be rejuvenated with 
appropriate modifications for place, space, and scale? Can some 
version of them be adjusted to fit within a socialist analysis based on 
concepts of surplus value, alienation, or class-monopoly rent? Their 
ambiguous status is unfortunate, as the shift in Harvey’s analytical 
frame coincides with, and heavily influences, a broader shift within 
economic geography towards political economy approaches. The result 
is that the ethical and political questions raised in Harvey’s liberal 
chapters are left behind (while ethics and politics are engaged 
differently within the new frame of Marxist political economy), and not 
just by Harvey but by most geographers; while the empirical questions 
have continued to be pursued in ignorance of Harvey’s challenge to 
the “artificial separation of methodology from philosophy” (Harvey 
1973: 11). 
Harvey’s principles of territorial social justice (above) formed a 
starting point for further inquiry. “However, the subsequent 
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development of human geography revealed little progress in this 
direction …. So, when Harvey (1996) returned to the subject at book 
length twenty-five years on [in Justice, Nature and the Geography of 
Difference], his central question of ‘the just production of just 
geographical differences’ was virtually the same as before” (Smith 
2000a: 137). David M. Smith has attempted to develop this thread 
within geography, with liberal borrowing from political philosophy and 
other disciplines (2000a, Smith 1994, 2000b). He situates his 
investigation of “the place of good fortune” in the tradition of Western 
philosophical interest in moral luck, and the idea that people should 
not be penalized (or rewarded) for arbitrary differences. 
Rawls argues that the distribution of social primary goods such as 
income, wealth, and political rights may not depend on arbitrary 
characteristics of individuals, such as race or age. He was criticized for 
not extending this to (arguably) equally arbitrary characteristics such 
as health and intelligence. Smith extends this argument from 
arbitrariness to the luck of being born and/or educated in one place or 
the other. Great differences in life chances attend to someone’s birth 
within one country or another, and even “within nation states, the 
quality of such services as health care and education may be so 
variable as to depend on what in Britain is referred to as a ‘post-code 
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lottery’” (Smith 2000a: 141-142). Smith argues for the general 
principle of “the more equal the better,” softened by the caveat that 
“the objective of reducing inequality, of moving towards equality, need 
not require a commitment to the achievement of perfect equality, soon 
or ever. Perfect equality may be held out as an ideal …, but in the real 
world of moderate scarcity, selfishness and actual inequality it is 
practically impossible, and not necessarily right” (Smith 1994: 118). 
While Smith and others focus on health care and education as being 
important in virtue of the fact that access to these goods is a major 
component of equality of opportunity, we can go further in observing 
the important neighborhood effects associated with production of 
healthy and educated individuals. For education, a long literature 
supports the idea that educational outcomes are strongly influenced by 
peer group composition. While Rawls envisages monetary 
redistribution among individuals, and Harvey and Smith lead us toward 
the idea of monetary redistribution among regions, this proposed 
redistribution can be significantly undermined by neighborhood effects. 
Duncombe and Yinger (1997) estimate that large city school districts in 
New York State would have to spend twice as much per pupil to 
achieve equivalent outcomes. Betts and Roemer estimate that 
equalizing opportunity between black and white males would require 
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spending nine times as much on the black students per capita (Betts, 
Roemer 2007). While racism doubtless plays a role in the different 
outcomes (Betts and Roemer use earning potential as the measure of 
outcome) of blacks and whites, racial differences in access to 
education manifest spatially. A large part of this difference may be due 
to the layering of neighborhood effects on top of racial segregation and 
class/income/education segregation. 
2.4 Spatialized Justice as Fairness
Rawlsian liberalism has not engaged urban inequality, or spatial 
inequality generally, and would need to be modified in order to do so. I 
have already discussed Harvey’s principles of territorial social justice, 
as well as the lack of subsequent development, by him or other 
geographers, following his conclusion that “programmes which seek to 
alter distribution without altering the capitalist market structure within 
which income and wealth are generated and distributed, are doomed 
to failure” (p. 110). But Harvey, already moving beyond liberal 
formulations, thought that the principles of territorial social justice 
could be used to guide a decentralized planning (i.e., nonmarket) 
process. It is with this in mind that I attempt to describe a basic 
structure that is consistent with territorial social justice, but, as with 
Rawls, I try to develop principles that are neutral with regard to 
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capitalist or socialist economic organization. 
There are several reasons for following this approach, not least of 
which is my disagreement with fundamental aspects of the Marxian 
program, including its millenarianism and its theory of surplus value. A 
full discussion is beyond the scope of this work. But a full discussion is 
also not necessary, as others have argued the compatibility of liberal 
or even specifically Rawlsian approaches to Marxian political economy. 
Katznelson argues that the Marxist critique of liberal rights was so 
thoroughgoing as to leave Marxist political economy with no tools for 
creating an arena for the representation of competing interests, in 
effect relinquishing such questions to liberal theory. “[L]iberal theory 
as it has developed [since Rawls] deserves our close attention because 
it currently constitutes the only serious site for deliberation about the 
principles and convictions that might help craft desirable political 
regimes…” (Katznelson 1997: 48). Further, there has been at least one 
serious attempt to extend Rawls’ theory in a Marxist direction, 
primarily through the addition of a principle of meeting basic needs, 
with priority over (modified versions of) Rawls’ two principles (Smith 
1994 discusses at length, Peffer 1990). Thus, while my own convictions 
are more compatible with liberalism, I believe the result of my 
investigation will be valuable to both liberal and radical geographers. 
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As already noted, Rawls proposes a four-stage sequence for arriving 
at justice. The spatial organization of urban systems interferes with 
achieving justice, primarily through the mutually reinforcing racial and 
socioeconomic segregation of both housing and education. An 
immediate question is at what stage of the four-stage sequence should 
spatial factors be taken into account? The answer is that we must 
consider spatial factors at each stage in order to develop a basic 
structure that is just, although we might conclude that space is not 
relevant in each of the four stages. 
Harvey’s two principles clearly echo Rawls’ two principles, and we 
therefore might be tempted to treat them as the results of first-stage 
deliberation. But they mix ideas relevant to more than one stage in the 
sequence. Each part of Harvey’s principles has an analogue in Rawls’ 
theory. Principle 1(a) concerns territorial need, and is equivalent to 
Rawls’ discussion of the “social minimum”, a minimum income 
guaranteed to all persons based on need (Rawls 1971: 244). Principle 
1(b) aims to maximize interterritorial multiplier effects, and is 
equivalent to the goal of maximizing welfare, which is not a principle of 
justice in Rawls’ scheme (Rawls 1971: 266). Principle 1(c) allocates 
extra resources to “help overcome special difficulties stemming from 
the physical and social environment”, and can be related to what 
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Rawls calls “the principle of redress” (Rawls 1971: 86). Finally, 
principle 2 is a direct application of the difference principle to 
territories rather than social positions. 
Of these, meeting territorial need and maximizing interterritorial 
multipliers are legislative (third) stage tasks. Further, welfare 
maximizing, as would be the point of maximizing interterritorial 
multipliers, must be subordinate to the demands of justice by 
reference to Rawls’ second priority rule (1971: 266). Principle 1(c) aims 
to redress environmental inequalities, and we can compare it to Rawls’ 
discussion of the redress of inequalities in natural advantages of 
persons. He argues that the principle of redress is a prima facie 
principle insufficient to serve as “the single aim of a social order”, and 
that the difference principle achieves some of the intent principle of 
redress. Again, consider education and the question of whether to 
concentrate educational spending on a particular group of students. 
According to the principle of redress, additional funding should be 
directed to the education of the least advantaged students. The intent 
of the principle would seem to be to improve the life chances of the 
least advantaged. The difference principle achieves this without 
insisting upon compensatory funding as the particular mechanism. It 
would allow (indeed require) us to direct greater funding toward the 
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more talented students if (as was previously hypothesized) such a 
policy would improve the well-being of the less talented students 
(Rawls 1971: 86–87). The three components of principle 1 are not the 
equivalent of a first-stage principle of justice, and principle 2 appears 
to be nothing more than a restatement of the difference principle in an 
explicitly territorial manner. Hence Pirie’s conclusion that this and 
subsequent discussion of spatial justice “calls for no other justice 
judgements than those which can be made in terms of some concept 
of social justice [emphasis mine]” (Pirie 1983: 470). I will argue that in 
addition to considering how space affects the basic structure at the 
later constitutional, legislative, and administrative stages, a true 
spatial justice requires the modification of the first stage principles of 
justice, and in at least one specific way, namely in accounting for 
access to immobile resources. 
At the first stage, behind the “thick” veil of ignorance, the parties 
nonetheless have knowledge of general facts about human society, 
including political and economic theory. They do not know 
particularities about their society, such as the level of civilization—a 
restriction which implies that, in spite of the similarities in terms of the 
emphasis on contract, this is not the same as a theory based upon the 
concept of a state of nature. The parties do not know which generation 
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they belong to. Generation and level of civilization would seem to be 
linked, so knowing one implies knowing the other. But Rawls 
introduces the concept of generation in order to address justice 
between generations, particularly with regard the conservation of 
natural resources and the savings rate (Rawls 1971: §24). Rawls’ 
discussion points to the obvious fact that the parties in the original 
position have a concept of time—perhaps already implicit within the 
idea that they know political and economic theory, but made clear by 
the examples of conservation and savings. I contend that space, like 
time, must be among the “general facts [which] affect the choice of 
the principles of justice”—in fact, time and space are supremely 
important. Space and time are the substrate for all social science, in 
fact all human knowledge and experience. 
With this knowledge of space comes a particular fact and a 
particular class of theories which are sufficiently important as to affect 
the choice of principles. The fact is that natural resources are 
heterogeneously distributed. Here I include not only resources such as 
forests and fossil fuels, but also any variation in physical geography 
that might affect distribution, such as fertile soil or deep draft ports. In 
addition to this fact, various theories of location demonstrate that, 
even given a counterfactual homogeneous physical geography, 
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concentrations of population and industry will emerge through the 
operation of market forces. These concentrations include concentric 
zones of agricultural use around the urban core (Thünen 1966 [1826]), 
concentric zones of other economic activities as established in the 
urban economics literature (Alonso 1964, Muth 1969, Mills, Resources 
for the Future 1972), systems of small and large cities as in the central 
place theory of Christaller and Lösch, and industrial agglomerations 
which create external economies of scale. All of these concentrations 
will have distributive impacts. 
How might the fact of variation in natural resources and other 
aspects of physical geography modify the principles of justice and the 
basic structure? While Harvey discusses “special difficulties stemming 
from the physical … environment,” special difficulties, like scarcity 
itself, are socially created. They are only those difficulties special to a 
particular region in relation to other regions. (This is of course merely 
an elaboration of Harvey’s meaning.) In terms of modifying the 
principles of justice, the idea of aiding regions that are specially 
disadvantaged can be better conceptualized as equalizing in relation to 
access to all natural resources and favorable or unfavorable 
characteristics of the physical environment. How the society chooses 
to do so is of course decided at a later stage of the sequence of 
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creating the basic structure, and Rawls wants his principles to be 
compatible with both democratic socialism and democratic capitalism. 
A socialist state might go so far as to decree that natural resources 
and land be owned by the state (all land, or perhaps merely land which 
offers unique advantages, such as port access). Under capitalism, 
where there might be a preference for retaining private ownership of 
land and natural resources, the state must nonetheless have a process 
in place for ensuring equal access, equal opportunity of access, and/or 
compensation for exclusive use. 
Elided in the quotation from Harvey in the last paragraph is a 
reference to the social, as well as the physical environment. Again, we 
observe that special difficulties of the social environment are (a 
fortiori) socially created, and that the issue again is equalizing between 
those regions and areas which are specially (dis)advantaged 
economically and socially. This connects neatly with the second way in 
which space must affect the choice of principles of justice, which is the 
uneven distribution of economic activity accounted for by theories of 
location. Although these theories are based on analysis of market 
forces, the spatial distributions that they predict must nonetheless be 
either adopted or rejected in a planned economy, and a planned 
economy might well organize production so as to mimic certain 
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aspects of these arrangements, as we see with Harvey’s principle that 
economic activity should be organized so as to take advantage of 
interregional multipliers. Under capitalism, capital may move to seek 
the highest return, but under either a planned economy or market 
socialism, capital must still be committed to specific locations, possibly 
for very long periods of time. Planners would want to make such 
decisions in a way that maximizes welfare, constrained by whatever 
principles they choose to guide them, which is consistent with Rawls’ 
point that welfare and efficiency are still valued, but justice is given 
priority. The point may be driven home by noting the difference 
between Christaller’s and Lösch’s approach to central place theory. 
While both relied upon a theory of supply-and-demand-based market 
behavior, Lösch’s version of central place theory was unabashedly 
normative.1 The point of all this is that some degree of variation of 
economic activity, at the scale of the city, systems of cities, the nation, 
and the world, will emerge or be intentionally created under any mode 
of production, and the principles of justice need to take this into 
account. Leaving aside how a market socialism might decide on where 
to invest capital, it is clear that even under democratic capitalism the 
1 The colophon from the concluding chapter of Smith’s Geography and Social Justice 
compares Lösch’s remark that “The real duty…is not to explain our sorry reality, 
but to improve it” to a similar point made by the well-known moral philosopher 
Bernard Williams: “The point of morality is not to mirror the world, but to change 
it.” (Smith 1994: 279)
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state must retain some authority over where capital is invested, and 
how so. This could include land use planning at the city and regional 
scale, inducements to bring capital to regions facing capital shortages 
(a move which Harvey believes to be self-defeating and which, as we 
have seen, leads him to the conclusion that capitalism is incompatible 
with social justice), and/or requiring compensation for the privilege of 
locating in areas with unique social and economic advantages. 
With these discussions in mind, I propose the following 
modifications to Rawls’ two principles (with my additions in italics): 
First Principle: Each person is to have an equal right to the 
most extensive total system of equal basic liberties 
compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. 
Second Principle: Social and economic inequalities are to be 
arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of 
the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings 
principle and the principle of sharing the advantages and 
liabilities of locations and natural resources, and (b) attached 
to offices and positions and locations open to all under 
conditions of fair equality of opportunity. 
Rawls distinguishes capitalism from socialism in that capitalism 
allows private ownership of capital and natural resources, but the 
ownership models for capital and land need not be the same. Many 
readers will probably recognize a Georgist middle way that treats 
capital as a productive factor that should remain under private control 
and be duly rewarded, while asserting a collective interest in landed 
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property (George 1879). The method of sharing the advantages and 
liabilities of locations and natural resources might vary under socialism 
and capitalism, but even under capitalism, justice would require that 
land and natural resources be subject to high levels of taxation with a 
strong presumption of state authority to (democratically and 
judiciously) exercise eminent domain and control land use planning.
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3 Homogeneity Tests of Tiebout Sorting: A 
Case Study at the Interface of City and Suburb
3.1 Introduction
One of the central problems in the provision of public goods is the 
lack of incentive for voters, who enjoy a common level of public service 
unrelated to their individual tax bill, to reveal their true demand. 
Tiebout (1956) proposes that for local public goods—i.e. those public 
goods whose benefits are confined to a small geographical area, such 
as playgrounds, elementary education, and fire protection—
preferences will be revealed if households “vote with their feet” by 
moving to the jurisdiction that best matches their desired mix of taxes 
and services. This will lead to jurisdictions which are homogeneous 
with respect to public service demand. Furthermore, such 
homogeneous jurisdictions sidestep the inefficiency associated with 
demand diversity—that is, it eliminates the situation where some 
households are forced to pay for a higher level of service than they 
want, while other households that would be willing to pay for a higher 
level of service are prevented from doing so. 
If public service demand correlates with observable household 
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characteristics, jurisdictions will also be homogeneous with respect to 
these observable characteristics. Thus, a long literature attempts to 
corroborate the Tiebout model by looking for evidence of such 
homogeneity. But using jurisdictional homogeneity as a test of the 
Tiebout hypothesis is complicated by several factors. First, Tiebout 
sorting must be distinguished from what we might refer to as non-
Tiebout sorting. A quick glance at the sociodemographic geography of 
any large city suggests that a large degree of sorting (by race or 
ethnicity, age, economic status, demand for non-public locational 
amenities, etc.) takes place within jurisdictions. If taxes and services 
are uniform throughout the city, such intrajurisdictional sorting cannot 
be accounted for by preferences in public services. Similar 
sociodemographic factors influence sorting in the suburbs, so an 
evaluation of Tiebout theory should not use such “baseline” sorting as 
evidence in favor of the theory. 
Second, some of the apparent homogeneity of small jurisdictions is 
merely a statistical artifact. One of the implications of the Tiebout 
model is that an increase in the number of jurisdictions (for a given 
population) will lead to greater “consumer choice” among jurisdictions, 
and therefore to more homogeneous jurisdictions. Since Dowding and 
John (1994) it has been recognized that this increased homogeneity is 
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at least partly a statistical artifact, since any randomly selected 
subsample is statistically likely to be more homogeneous than the 
population from which it is drawn. 
Third, no research that I know of has addressed multiple scales of 
sorting, and the statistical problem posed by spatial dependence of 
population data. This can lead to a misattribution of the scale of sorting 
(e.g., Tiebout-induced sorting at the municipal level could be 
interpreted as sorting at the school district level, or vice versa) and of 
the cause of sorting (i.e., the sociodemographic dimensions along 
which people sort themselves). 
Because of these issues, homogeneity has been found where it is 
has been looked for. Therefore, in this chapter I develop a method for 
finding sorting that is a priori agnostic about what political unit will 
exhibit sorting behavior. Homogeneity and sharp sociodemographic 
transitions can be read off of the landscape. Neighboring census tracts 
are paired across the study area and metrics of difference are 
calculated for the neighboring populations, including three alternative 
measures of income heterogeneity and, for categorical data such as 
race and presence of children, indices of dissimilarity. I hypothesize 
that if some of the observed sorting is due to the Tiebout mechanism, 
the sharpest differences should coincide with political and service 
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boundaries, and test this hypothesis using OLS regression. 
3.2 Sorting Implications of the Tiebout Hypothesis
A typical investigation of the sorting implications of the Tiebout 
hypothesis is a cross-MSA study which tests the relationship between 
jurisdictional homogeneity and the number of local governments. The 
researchers begin by choosing the population characteristics of 
interest. Since higher-income jurisdictions spend more on public 
services (Inman 1979), household income is a frequently investigated 
characteristic. After selecting a population characteristic, the 
researchers develop a homogeneity measure (examples of which are 
discussed below) and regress the homogeneity measure on variables 
representing likely influences. These likely influences include the 
number of jurisdictions, as well as factors expected to interfere with 
the Tiebout mechanism such as state aid to local governments. If 
Tiebout sorting is taking place, greater jurisdictional choice is 
anticipated to lead to greater homogeneity in the investigated 
characteristics. 
Several such studies compare a measure of homogeneity with 
jurisdictional choice. Pack and Pack (1977) characterize Pennsylvania 
towns as homogeneous or heterogeneous by applying a modified Leik 
Index to ranked income, occupation, household type, education, and 
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age characteristics. They find that only 2% of towns are age 
homogeneous, while 42% of towns are homogeneous by household 
type, and 41% are homogeneous by occupation. They find 36% of 
towns homogeneous by education level, but only 11% of towns 
homogeneous by income level. Pack and Pack emphasize the low level 
of income homogeneity found in their study, and conclude that “either 
the desire for homogeneity is less important than is generally 
believed” or other factors are interfering with the sorting mechanism 
(1977: 199). 
Eberts and Gronberg (1981) investigate income sorting at the 
school district level across 34 MSAs within seven states. They 
characterize homogeneity by the Theil entropy measure of income 
inequality, a measure which is decomposable into within-group and 
between-group inequality. Their dependent variable, representing 
heterogeneity, is within-jurisdiction inequality divided by total 
metropolitan inequality. A larger number of jurisdictions is expected to 
increase sorting, and therefore decrease the heterogeneity measure. 
Regression across MSAs confirms the expectation. They also find that 
heterogeneity decreases with demand for educational services 
(represented as the percentage of the population under age 18). 
Heterogeneity increases with average district population, equalizing 
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aid from the state, and total MSA inequality. “One might expect that 
since an increase in total inequality causes a greater disparity within 
the population of relative tax burdens of families and their preferences 
of local public goods, there would be a greater incentive for families to 
stratify” (1981: 237). Their results generally confirm predictions of the 
Tiebout hypothesis. 
Dowding and John (1994) discuss these and other investigations of 
the Tiebout hypothesis in a section on homogeneity and sorting 
implications. They claim that these studies are broadly “consistent with 
Tiebout, but…not truly corroborative” (1994: 774). In particular, 
Dowding and John point out the problem of accounting for statistical 
sorting. Since many smaller jurisdictions provide more choices for 
possible residents, a prediction of Tiebout theory is that smaller 
jurisdictions will be more homogeneous than larger jurisdictions. 
However, any randomly selected subpopulation is statistically likely to 
show lower variance than the population from which it is selected. 
Therefore, another problem in evaluating Tiebout theory is 
distinguishing Tiebout sorting from this statistical artifact. Dowding and 
John conclude:
Correlating the number of jurisdictions with degree of 
homogeneity does no more than confirm the null hypothesis
—since statistically that is what we should expect. That 
sorting occurs beyond this is almost certainly true but the 
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research shows mixed evidence that local tax and 
expenditure variables affect the process…. Few writers are 
aware of the logic of different sorting processes and so do not 
even attempt to distinguish between them. Future research 
needs to refine the measures in order to produce relevant 
tests of Tiebout (Dowding, John 1994: 775).
Following Dowding and John, researchers have applied new 
methods to control for the problem of statistical sorting. Interestingly, 
these studies move away from the use of cross-MSA regressions, and 
focus instead on whether observed municipal homogeneity within a 
single MSA is statistically significant. If the observed homogeneity is 
not statistically significant, there is no reason to “explain” the variance 
in homogeneity using cross-MSA methods. Two examples follow. 
Heikkila (1996) uses tract-level data to investigate sorting in Los 
Angeles County. He uses factor analysis to reduce a large number of 
sociodemographic variables to 16 factors explaining 70% of the 
variance in the original dataset. He then uses and analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) to determine whether these factors are significantly different 
from each other at the municipal level, and finds that they are for 15 
out 16 of the retained factors. 
Bickers and Engstrom (2006) use data from the Atlanta and Houston 
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Table 3.1: Study Area Characteristics
Queens County Nassau County
Population 2000 2.2 million 1.3 million
Density 2000 (persons / sq mi) 21000 4700
Municipalities 1 city (part of New York City) 2 cities; 64 villages
Unincorporated Areas None 3 towns
School Districts 7 (elementary) 54 (unified or elementary)
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Metropolitan Statistical Areas to compare degrees of sorting on a 
composite diversity measure that encompasses age, education, 
income, housing structure, occupation, race, and ethnicity at the level 
of the census tract. They then use Monte Carlo iteration to bootstrap 
spatial information about residential choice in their study areas. Monte 
Carlo iteration is the repeated simulation of a probabilistic process in 
order to generate a sample population of outcomes. Real-world 
observations can then be compared to this population of possible 
outcomes in order to determine whether the observed outcome is 
likely or anomalous. For each municipality in the two MSAs, they 
evaluate the likelihood that the observed diversity is due to random 
chance. They reject the null hypothesis of random sorting (p < 0.05) 
for only 4 out of 44 Houston municipalities and none of 42 Atlanta 
municipalities. They therefore conclude that for most municipalities, 
observed sorting is not due to a Tiebout-type process. 
Although Dowding and John call attention to the problem of 
statistical sorting, homogeneity tests of the Tiebout hypothesis face a 
more severe challenge due to the spatial dependence of 
sociodemographic data. The statistical sorting problem that Dowding 
and John describe is that a randomly selected subset of households 
within an MSA is statistically likely to be more homogeneous than the 
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MSA as a whole. But if households locate near other households with 
similar characteristics, a subset selected within a contiguous 
geographic area will not be an independent sample, and will be even 
more homogeneous than a subset selected at random from across the 
MSA. For example, households might sort by religion without regard to 
political boundaries, yet because of spatial dependence religious 
homogeneity would be found at the level of the political jurisdiction. 
Households might sort based on public services provided by one kind 
of government, such as school district, but homogeneity would also be 
found at the level of the municipality. While this is obvious for the case 
where school districts and municipalities are coextensive, due to 
spatial dependence homogeneity at the municipal level will be found 
even when municipal and school district boundaries are not 
coextensive (provided municipalities are not too much larger than 
school districts). In short, existing approaches will tend to find sorting 
at whatever geographic unit is selected for study, with no necessary 
relationship to the Tiebout mechanism. 
3.3 Methods and Data
In order to investigate whether and at what level of government 
Tiebout sorting is taking place, I investigate the neighboring counties 
of Queens and Nassau in the New York–Northern New Jersey–Long 
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Island MSA (See Table 3.1). Queens (2.2 million population in 2000) is a 
jurisdictionally unified county that is part of New York City. Queens 
(indeed, all of New York City) has one secondary school district, but 
several elementary school districts. Nassau has 54 school districts and 
70 general purpose governments for a smaller population (1.3 million 
in 2000). The general purpose governments in Nassau include the 
county government, 3 towns (incorporated county subdivisions), 2 
cities, and 64 villages. In New York State, all land is in either a city or a 
town, but not both.2 Villages are incorporated areas within towns. 
Therefore, land in Nassau may be city; town but not village; or town 
and village. Villages can cross town borders (which 7 in the study area 
do) as well as county borders (which none in the study area do). Cities 
differ from towns in having greater autonomy and individual charters, 
while villages follow a standard form of government set by state law. 
Villages choose which services to provide on their own and which 
services to have the town provide. Cities and villages in Nassau are 
similar in that they are both geographically small incorporated 
municipalities. Cities and villages control their own zoning, while towns 
control zoning for those parts of the town which are outside of villages 
(NYS DOS 2008). 
2 Some state land is in Indian Reservations, which are legally distinct and not part of 




While New York State law has its own unique typology of school 
districts, most of Nassau’s 54 school districts are classified by the US 
Census Bureau as unified school districts, which means they 
encompass both elementary and secondary schools. School districts in 
most of New York State (including Nassau) have the power to levy 
property taxes. Their budgets are submitted to local voters. If rejected, 
the school district can submit a revised budget for a vote or can 
operate under a “default” budget which allows certain automatic 
spending increases from the previous year’s budget. In Queens (NYC), 
the school district is financed by general funds. The study focuses on 
secondary school districts (and unified school districts, which are also 
secondary school districts). Elementary only borders are ignored, as 
the results of early analysis distinguishing elementary from secondary 
school districts were difficult to interpret. School districts in New York 
State can (and in the study area do) cross village, town, and county 
borders. One school district crosses the border of Nassau and Suffolk 
counties. No school districts cross the Queens–Nassau border (NYS 
DOS 2008). 
The study design is a priori agnostic about what types of local 
governments might show evidence of Tiebout-induced homogeneity. 
Instead of looking for evidence of homogeneity among households or 
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census tracts grouped by jurisdiction, local heterogeneity is 
characterized throughout the study area, and I investigate whether 
observed local heterogeneity is correlated with jurisdictional 
boundaries. By characterizing heterogeneity across the study area, this 
approach is conceptually similar to the remote sensing problem of 
finding the boundaries between different classes of land cover, e.g. 
forest and grass (DeMers 2000). We are interested in heterogeneity 
over a few different dimensions: income, race, and presence of 
children (theoretically important for school district choice), all of which 
are expressed quantitatively as difference across boundaries of 
neighboring census tracts. The focus on differences across boundaries 
has also been used in several capitalization studies, including Black 
(1999), Bayer, et al. (2007), and Thorsnes and Reifel (2007). Black 
(1999) and Thorsnes and Reifel (2007) both make use of house-level 
sales data and Census aggregate demographic data. Bayer, et al. 
(2007) make use of restricted-access Census data. The present study 
uses publicly available Census data, and focuses entirely on economic 
and demographic sorting.
The population data comes from the 2000 Census. Census blocks 
are topologically ideal because the Census Bureau constructs blocks to 
correspond with natural and administrative borders. Therefore, blocks 
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will not be divided across towns, villages, or school districts. 
Unfortunately, income data are only available at the larger 
geographies of blocks groups and tracts. Block groups and tracts 
conform well to villages and towns in the study area, but not to school 
districts. This study uses block group level data. 
The geographic data that we use includes census tracts, block 
groups, and counties (ESRI 2004b, ESRI 2004a), school districts (NYS 
ORPS 2001), and civil boundaries for general purpose local 
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Illustration 3.1: Heteroscedastic t-Statistic Compared with Village 
Borders
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governments such as towns and villages (NYS CSCIC 2007). The unit of 
analysis is a block group boundary, which is the arc which separates 
two contiguous census tracts. ArcGIS 9.2 (ESRI 2007) was used to 
extract these arcs from the census tract polygons for visualization of 
the data. Each arc is associated with the block groups on either side, 
and heterogeneity metrics are calculated based on the populations of 
each block group pair. Each arc is categorized according to the local 
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Illustration 3.2: Heteroscedastic t-Statistic Compared with School  
District Borders
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government borders it coincides with. If the neighboring census block 
groups are in different towns, the arc is classified as a town border. If 
the neighboring block groups are in different villages, or (since villages 
do not fill the landscape) one block group is in a village and one block 
group isn’t, the arc is classified as a village border. These categories 
are entered as dummy variables in the regressions, with the “neutral” 
category being a block group boundary which does not coincide with 
any jurisdictional borders. For villages, towns, cities, and counties, the 
spatial matches between block group boundaries and jurisdictional 
borders are exact. Since school district boundaries do not match up 
with census block group boundaries, school district borders are 
classified based on a proportion of nonoverlapping population. Mutually 
exclusive populations are assigned a border value of 1, and completely 
overlapping populations (both block groups are in the same school 
district) are assigned a border value of 0.
Each OLS regression is set up with a dependent variable 
representing heterogeneity—that is, representing the strength of the 
difference between the populations of the neighboring block groups—
and independent variables representing jurisdictional boundaries and 
other likely influences on heterogeneity. The boundaries of block 
groups with few or no households were excluded. Among these were 
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unpopulated (or nearly unpopulated) areas such as parks and open 
space, airports, and industrial areas, but also areas primarily or 
exclusively populated by group quarters residents, such as a 
psychiatric facility in Eastern Queens. 
3.3.1 Dependent Variables
The influence of jurisdictional boundaries is tested against sorting 
by income, by race/ethnicity, and by presence of school-aged children. 
Income-based sorting has been most often studied in relation to the 
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Tiebout hypothesis. A number of different measures of income 
heterogeneity are used in this investigation, including a t-statistic, a 
Theil Inequality measure as used by Eberts and Gronberg (1981), and a 
simple difference of median incomes. The t-statistic and Theil measure 
require data at the household level. Income is reported by the Census 
classified into $5000 ranges for incomes below $50,000, and in 
increasingly larger ranges above $50,000 up to the “$200,000 or 
more” class. Previous studies have estimated household-level income 
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at the midpoint of each range (Eberts, Gronberg 1981, Ottensmann 
1982). This study instead estimates household-level income so as to 
ensure that it sums to the block group’s aggregate income reported in 
SF3 Table P54 – “Aggregate Household Income in 1999”. Table P54 
reports aggregate income for two classes of households: those earning 
above and those earning below $200,000. Calculating average income 
for the “$200,000 or more” class is straightforward, since we are given 
the aggregate and the number of households. Average income for 
households in each class below $200,000 is calculated as follows. First 
a scaling factor, SF
k









Y is the aggregate income for households in the tract with 
income below $200,000; 
k is the index of the income class; 
n
k
 is the number of households in class k; 
LB
k
 is the lower bound of class k; 
Range
k
 is the range (upper bound – lower bound + 1) of class 
k. 
The average income, Y
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SF varies between 0 and 2. If SF = 1, the average income falls at 
the midpoint of the range. 
The household incomes in the neighboring block groups are then 
used to calculate two measures of difference: the t-statistic and the 
Theil inequality measure. The t-statistic is a variance-adjusted 
difference of means with a straightforward interpretation. Not only 
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does a greater absolute difference in mean incomes affect t plausibly 
(making it increase), but Tiebout sorting implies that smaller 
jurisdictions should have more homogeneous populations within each 
jurisdiction. More homogeneous populations have a smaller income 
variance, which again yields an increased t-statistic. Note that this 
does not mean the statistical sorting problem has returned, because 
the t-statistic is not based on the income profile of the jurisdiction, only 
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Illustration 3.6: Racial Index of Dissimilarity Compared with School 
District Borders
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that of the block group. Illustrations 3.1 and 3.2 map the value of t 
over our study area. The figures are based on the same equations as 
the regressions, but using tracts instead of block groups as the 
geographic building block, in order to provide maps which are visually 
intelligible, i.e. not too densely clustered to make out the details. 
Visually, high values of t seem to coincide with village borders (villages 
are shaded blue) in Nassau County, but do not seem to coincide with 
school district borders. 
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An alternative measure of difference is the commonly used Theil 
inequality measure. This measure is decomposable into within-group 



































where the left-hand term represents total inequality, the first right-
hand term represents between-group inequality, the second right-hand 
term represents within-group inequality, and
N is the number of households in both block groups; 
G is the number of block groups (since the study uses paired 
block groups, G= 2 always); 
Y
i




 is tract g’s share of the total income of both block groups; 
N
g
 is the number of households in block group g; 
S
g
 is the set of households in block group g. 
Following Eberts and Gronberg (1981), heterogeneity is expressed 
as the ratio of between-group inequality to the total inequality of the 
paired block groups. (In Eberts and Gronberg’s cross-MSA analysis, 
they focus on homogeneity—they therefore use the ratio of within-
group inequality to the total inequality of the metropolitan area. This 
chapter instead uses between-group inequality so that the inequality 
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measure can be interpreted the same way as the alternative measures
—in each case, a larger value means a greater difference between the 
populations of the neighboring block groups.) Illustrations 3.3 and 3.4 
show results similar to the t-statistic: between-group inequality seems 
to coincide with village borders, but not with school districts. 
Finally, both of these income heterogeneity measures are compared 
with the computationally easier difference of median incomes, based 
on the tract median income reported by the Census Bureau. If this 
measure produces similar results to the t-statistic and the Theil 
measure, it might be preferable to use because it would be easier to 
operationalize over a large geographic area. Maps of the difference of 
median incomes (not shown) look similar to the maps of t and Theil 
inequality shown in Illustrations 3.1 through 3.4. 
In order to measure racial segregation as well as sorting by the 
presence of children in the household, we turn to the well-known index 












i is an index of subareas in the study region; 
a
i
 is the population of group A in subarea i; 
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A is the population of group A in the study region; 
b
i
 is the population of group B in subarea i; 
B is the population of group B in the study region. 
D can only measure segregation between two demographic groups. 
Therefore it is usually calculated in studies of racial segregation as 
showing segregation of Whites (or non-Hispanic Whites) from Blacks, 
Hispanics, Asians, another specific racial or ethnic group, or from all 
minority groups combined. It is usually calculated for a geographic 
area with many small subareas—for example, D might be calculated 
for the MSA using census tracts as subareas. It can vary from 0, 
indicating that all subareas (tracts) have the same proportion of the 
minority population as the entire region (MSA), to 1, indicating that 
every subarea is exclusively populated by one of the two groups being 
investigated. 
D is subject to the modifiable areal unit problem (MAUP), in that 
small-area geographic units are empirically more homogeneous than 
larger units, so calculating D for an MSA using smaller subareas, such 
as census tracts, will yield a higher value than if larger subareas were 
used, such as counties (Wong 1997). Furthermore, this inflation of the 
index can mask spatial patterns that might mitigate segregation. 
Assuming every subarea is exclusively populated by the majority group 
81
Chapter 3
or the minority group, most observers would judge segregation to be 
lower if minority enclaves were scattered throughout the study region 
than if the minority subareas were concentrated in one part of the 
region. Modifications to D have been developed by Wong (1993) that 
account for spatial interaction between the populations of adjacent 
subareas. If majority group subareas are found next to minority group 
subareas, D can be considerably reduced. Wong has gone further in 
calculating D (or one of several variants that account for spatial 
interaction) separately for each census tract based on the population 
of its adjacent tracts, in order to show variation in segregation patterns 
across space (2002, 2005). The maps of locally varying heterogeneity 
included in this chapter bear some resemblance to Wong’s maps of 
locally varying segregation. This study does not apply the spatial 
interaction adjustments, many of which are inapplicable to regions 
which, like the paired tracts and block groups here, have only two 
subareas. However, independent variables are use to control for 
expected spatial interaction between subareas. 
D is calculated based on standard Census racial and ethnic 
groupings, with Hispanics of all races broken out into their own group. 
Therefore, Whites will refer to non-Hispanic Whites, Blacks will refer to 
non-Hispanic Blacks, etc. Since D can only be applied to two groups, it 
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is calculated alternately for White-Black segregation, White-Hispanic 
segregation, and locally dominant segregation based on the top two 
race/ethnicity groups in each paired block group. Illustrations 3.5 and 
3.6 compare the index of dissimilarity for the top two groups in each 
pair to village or school district borders. Visually, the relationship is 
ambiguous, with inconsistent matching of jurisdictional boundaries 
with a medium or high index of dissimilarity. 
D is also used as a measure of sorting among households with and 
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Table 3.2: Regression Results, Income-Based Sorting
Dependent Variable:
t-Statistic (Heteroscedastic)
Independent Variables: Model 1A Model 1B Model 2A Model 2B Model 3A Model 3B
(Intercept) 2.688*** 2.530*** 0.012*** 0.009*** 6314.031*** 5320.104***
(0.100) (0.102) (0.002) (0.002) (441.472) (459.212)
Jurisdictional queens_nassau -0.973 -0.029** -4325.098
Borders (0.591) (0.009) (2602.762)
nassau_village 2.477*** 0.053*** 18180.410***
(0.157) (0.002) (692.552)
nassau_town 0.461 0.007 175.704
(0.405) (0.006) (1784.675)
nassau_city 3.487*** 0.055*** 5286.28
(0.726) (0.011) (3195.271)
sdsec 0.361 1.297*** 0.006 0.023*** 111.652 5636.933***
(0.186) (0.163) (0.003) (0.003) (819.553) (738.811)
Spatial distance_km 1.732*** 2.118*** 0.031*** 0.038*** 10123.624*** 12642.192***
Interaction (0.225) (0.228) (0.003) (0.004) (989.888) (1028.730)
Measures distance_km2 -0.046 -0.069 -0.005*** -0.006*** -817.815** -984.820**
(0.070) (0.071) (0.001) (0.001) (307.522) (320.924)
Other suburban -0.489*** -0.280** -0.002 0.003* 2869.783*** 4466.602***
Variables (0.099) (0.097) (0.001) (0.001) (434.861) (436.180)
adj. R-squared 0.106 0.072 0.131 0.071 0.216 0.143
F 114.475 149.475 144.705 145.498 263.511 318.434
N 7620 7620 7615 7615 7620 7620
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Theil Inequality (Ratio of 
Between-Group to Total)
Absolute Difference of 
Median Income
* Significant at p < 0.1
** Significant at p < 0.05
*** Significant at p < 0.01
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without school-aged children, D
children
. In this case, there are only two 
groups, and the meaning of D
children
 is consistent. Illustration 3.7 shows 
no visually obvious correlation between D
children
 and school district 
borders. A map of D
children
 against village borders (not shown) also 
shows no visually obvious correlation. Of interest, however, is the fact 
that households with school-aged children are much more sharply 
separated from childless households in the central city county of 
Queens than in the suburban county of Nassau.
3.3.2 Independent Variables
Economic and demographic sorting is a feature of the American 
landscape. But can observed sorting be explained as resulting of 
households choosing particular packages of taxes and services? If 
Tiebout sorting is taking place, neighboring block groups separated by 
a jurisdictional border would be expected to be more heterogeneous 
than block groups in the same jurisdiction. The study design relies on 
the expectation that in a Tiebout world, there should be enough 
jurisdictional variation in service levels that the jurisdictional border 
itself can be used as an indication of service differences. Actual service 
differences are not measured.
As described earlier, most of the independent variables are dummy 
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variables representing whether the block group boundary coincides 
with a jurisdictional border. The borders being investigated include the 
borders of school districts, towns (county subareas), suburban cities, 
suburban villages, and the Queens-Nassau border which separates city 
from suburb. Most of the school districts in the study area are unified 
school districts. Elementary school district borders are not included in 
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Table 3.3: Regression Results, Sorting By Race and Presence of 
School-Aged Children
Dependent Variable:
Independent Variables: Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
(Intercept) 0.240*** 0.189*** 0.165*** 0.219***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009)
Jurisdictional queens_nassau -0.115** 0.018 0.064* -0.049
Borders (0.039) (0.031) (0.029) (0.032)
nassau_village 0.059*** 0.018* 0.015 0.004
(0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.014)
nassau_town 0.055* 0 -0.001 0.020
(0.027) (0.021) (0.020) (0.028)
nassau_city -0.081 0.039 0.027 -0.047
(0.047) (0.038) (0.035) (0.052)
sdsec 0.055*** 0.042*** 0.069*** 0.006
(0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011)
Spatial distance_km 0.079*** 0.049*** 0.056*** 0.077***
Interaction (0.015) (0.012) (0.011) (0.014)
Measures distance_km2 -0.023*** -0.016*** -0.021*** (0.009)***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
Other suburban -0.052*** 0.030*** 0.046*** -0.149***
Variables (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 0.013
adj. R-squared 0.017 0.026 0.059 0.062
F 17.401 26.104 61.174
N 7620 7620 7620 2330














* Significant at p < 0.1
** Significant at p < 0.05
*** Significant at p < 0.01
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the analysis.
Independent variables are selected that might plausibly influence 
heterogeneity across block group boundaries. Of primary importance is 
controlling for spatial interaction, the way that spatial characteristics of 
the local area influence the interaction between neighboring 
populations. The motivating assumption is that households will be 
more likely to move to a place if they have already socially interacted 
with the current residents, and therefore social interaction between 
two areas will lead to more similar populations; i.e., where spatial 
interaction between neighboring block groups is high, heterogeneity 
will be low. Wong (1993) discusses ways to correct D for spatial 
interaction between neighboring tracts, including the length of the 
shared border and a shape index equal to the average of the ratio of 
the perimeter to the area (P/A) of the neighboring tracts. Since census 
tracts and block groups are often oddly shaped, it seems that the 
length of the shared border is an inconsistent metric of spatial 
interaction. Consider the difference in the metric between two 
octagons that share an edge versus two squares of equal area that 
share an edge. The octagons will generate a lower spatial interaction 
metric because of their shorter sides, but an ideal metric would be 
more nearly equal for the octagons and the squares (assuming that the 
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space outside the octagons is not water or some other barrier to 
spatial interaction). The alternative spatial interaction metric, the 
shape index, is a measure of compactness: a circle has the lowest 
possible P/A ratio. A square has a lower P/A ratio than a rectangle. In 
this case the proposed metric again seems inconsistent. Two 
contiguous rectangles could offer much greater opportunity for spatial 
interaction than two squares if they connect along their long side. They 
would offer much lower opportunity for spatial interaction than the 
squares if they connect along their short side. 
One of the commonest measures of spatial interaction is distance, 
and this is what is used for this study. Distance between the block 
group centroids (geometric centers of mass) is the measure used. 
Spatial interaction may not decline linearly with distance, so distance 
may be raised to a power. Distance squared yields a so-called gravity 
model. Often, both distance and distance squared will be included so 
that spatial interaction may be allowed to vary in intensity and sign as 
distance changes. F-tests indicate that models with both distance 
variables perform better than models with only one or the other. 
Finally, a dummy variable is included to indicate whether the tract 
boundary is suburban (in Nassau County). Tiebout sorting relies on the 
possibility of choosing between a large number of competing 
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jurisdictions (Tiebout 1956), a condition which is met in the suburbs, 
but not in large heterogeneous central cities. It seems important to 
control for suburban location so that, if it so happens that there is an 
overall higher level of tract-level sorting in the suburbs, this will not be 
misinterpreted as jurisdictional sorting in the regression.
3.4 Results
OLS is used to regress the dependent variables, including three 
alternative measures of income heterogeneity and four measures of 
demographic sorting, on the independent variables described above. 
The income regressions appear in Table 3.2. Models 1A and 1B use the 
heteroscedastic t-statistic as the measure of income heterogeneity; 
models 2A and 2B use Theil inequality (the ratio of between-group to 
total inequality); and models 3A and 3B use the absolute difference of 
median incomes. The A models include all jurisdictional borders, while 
the B models include only school district borders. 
In all six income models, one or both of the spatial interaction 
measures are statistically significant at. Centroid distance is relatively 
large and positive (p < 0.01 in all six models) while centroid distance 
squared is relatively small and negative (though not significant in the t-
statistic models), indicating that heterogeneity increases quickly with 
increasing distance when tract centroids are close to each other (i.e., 
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when tracts are small/compact/tightly joined), but increases more 
slowly when tract centroids are already far apart (i.e., when tracts are 
large/convoluted/tenuously joined). The suburban dummy is significant 
in the Models 1A&B and 3A&B and only weakly significant in Model 2B. 
Its sign is negative, indicating that after other effects are controlled 
for, neighboring census tracts in suburban areas are more similar in 
household income than neighboring tracts in the city. The magnitude 
of the effect, however, is generally weaker than the effect of the other 
significant variables. 
The general purpose local government borders appear only in the A 
models. Queens/Nassau is only significant in model 2A. Town borders 
(nassau_town) are not significant in any of the three models. Village 
borders (nassau_village) are strongly significant (p < 0.01) in all three 
A models, and shows the largest effect of all the independent 
variables. Model 3A indicates that paired block groups on opposite 
sides of a village border show a difference in median incomes that 
more than $18,000 greater than the difference for block group pairs 
that do not straddle a village border. Nassau city borders are strongly 
significant in models 1A and 2A, and the coefficients in those models 
are similar in magnitude to the coefficients on village borders. In model 
3A, which uses difference in median incomes for the income 
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heterogeneity measure, city borders are not significant and the 
coefficient is one-third the magnitude of the coefficient on village 
borders. 
Finally, the coefficient on the school district borders variable is not 
small and insignificant in all of the A models. Tiebout sorting by school 
district has often been investigated by past studies, with generally 
corroborating results. And the importance of school districts in where 
households choose to live is a widely accepted truism. The nonexistent 
support for sorting by school district these models provide is curious. I 
hypothesize that previous work has failed to distinguish the effect of 
school district sorting from sorting over other local government 
jurisdictions. The test of this hypothesis is shown in the B models, 
which exclude other local government borders from the regressions. In 
all three models, the magnitude of the coefficient on increases, and 
the coefficients are strongly significant (p < 0.01). Thus, investigating 
school district sorting without accounting for choice over other local 
governments will lead to invalid conclusions. This is discussed further 
in the concluding section of this chapter. 
Models 4 through 7 appear in Table 3.3. (Model 7 is based on tract-
level data.) The first thing to note is that the adjusted R2 for these 
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models are extremely small. Whatever these models show, it is clear 
that they do not capture the vast majority of influences on household 
sorting by race and by presence of school-aged children. 
As with the income regressions, the demographic dissimilarity 
models show strongly significant (p < 0.01) coefficients on the spatial 
interaction measures and on suburban location. The coefficient on the 
suburban dummy in Model 7 is large and negative, indicating that city 
households are much more likely than suburban households to 
segregate based on the presence of school-aged children. Beyond that, 
Model 7 shows no influence of any jurisdictional borders on the family 
structure index of dissimilarity, including, surprisingly, school district 
borders. 
Model 4, which investigates White/Black dissimilarity, does show 
significant coefficients for Queens/Nassau border (p < 0.05) and 
Nassau village borders (p < 0.01), and all three race-ethnicity 
dissimilarity measures have significant coefficients for school district 
borders (p < 0.01). Racial sorting can of course be driven by many 
factors. Tiebout sorting by race requires racial differences in demand 
for public services. Other factors contributing to racial sorting include 
racial steering in the home renting/buying process (Turner et al. 2002), 
redlining (Jackson 1985), and the persistence of historical segregation. 
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Furthermore, the race-ethnicity dissimilarity models do not control for 
income characteristics, leaving open the possibility that the model is 
just measuring income sorting another way. Mitigating against this 
interpretation, note that the coefficient on the school districts variable 
is roughly equal to the coefficient on village borders, whereas in the 
income regressions the coefficient was an order of magnitude smaller. 
In the Southern part of Nassau County, two pairs of census tracts show 
evidence of racial sorting: one pair straddles the divide between the 
Freeport and Merrick school districts, the other straddles the Uniondale 
and Garden City school districts. For each pair, the census tract in the 
first school district is approximately one-quarter White, with Blacks and 
Hispanics predominating, while its neighbor in the latter school district 
is over 90% White. This is the starkest example, but gives some 
credibility to the result.
Although the model leaves much out, it is clearly indicating that 
race plays a relatively greater role in sorting by school district than in 
sorting by general purpose local governments. This could be 
interpreted as meaning that households place more importance on 
having their children attend racially/ethnically homogeneous schools 
than on living in racially/ethnically homogeneous neighborhoods. This 
in turn raises a host of question which we cannot here address 
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regarding how well movers are able to evaluate school quality 
(Buckley, Schneider 2006, Teske et al. 1993), their reliance on 
heuristics to evaluate school quality (Bickers, Stein 1998), and the 
extent to which race dominates other factors in school choice 
(Hamilton, Guin 2005).
The regressions overall provide additional evidence in favor of the 
Tiebout model, but also caution the researcher to be careful in drawing 
conclusions regarding which unit of government is actually influencing 
the household’s decision about where to relocate. When jurisdictional 
borders are not coterminous, choosing along one dimension may mean 
subordinating choice along another dimension. 
3.5 Conclusion
Household sorting along a variety of economic and demographic 
dimensions is an inarguable feature of the American housing 
landscape. The Tiebout model suggests that some of this sorting is due 
to household choice regarding tax and service packages provided by 
local governments. This investigation of household heterogeneity in 
the neighboring central city/suburban counties of Queens and Nassau, 
New York, supports this hypothesis with evidence that sharper 
economic and demographic differences coincide with certain kinds of 
jurisdictional borders. The evidence is strongest for sorting by income 
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across small, general purpose local governments. While many studies 
have found evidence of Tiebout sorting at the level of school districts, 
the current study produces more ambiguous results. There is no 
evidence of income sorting across school districts. On the other hand, 
there evidence of strong racial sorting across school districts, though 
overall racial/ethnic dissimilarity models explain little of the variation in 
racial heterogeneity across our study area. 
The ambiguity of the evidence regarding sorting across school 
districts wants explaining, in particular the lack of a strong relationship 
between income and school district choice. The following section is 
fairly speculative, and additional work will be necessary to determine 
which of these explanations might have merit. Two broad classes of 
explanation are possible. Either sorting is taking place at the level of 
school-districts, but our method is not able to find it; or sorting at the 
school district level is not as important as generally assumed, and 
studies that have found evidence of it have been flawed. 
In the first class of explanation, it is possible that sorting is taking 
place at the school district level but homogeneity is just a poor test of 
the Tiebout mechanism. This would be the case if unobserved public 
service demand does not correlate with observed economic and 
demographic characteristics. However, this explanation is not 
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consistent with the success of the method in finding evidence of 
sorting at the municipal level. Alternatively, we might consider that 
Tiebout competition is taking place, but the result of Tiebout 
competition is that most or all suburban school districts provide the 
same level of service. This explanation works particularly well with the 
flight-from-blight theory of suburbanization. Higher-income households 
seeking good schools will set off a “race to the top” among suburban 
school districts, leaving the central city to lower-income households. A 
relative homogeneity of outcomes in suburban school districts would 
make fine-grained income sorting unnecessary. Investigating this 
further would require data on school performance, and remains a 
possible direction for future research.
Accepting the finding that income sorting by school district is weak 
or nonexistent, what explanations could account for it? Note that 
education is not a typical public good, in that it is net characterized by 
joint consumption (additional children require additional teachers and 
other resources to produce equivalent learning) and it is not 
nonexcludable (a child has to be enrolled to be allowed in the 
classroom). Furthermore, education can be and frequently is 
purchased privately. Not only will this interfere with the expected 
homogeneity, Nechyba goes so far as to suggest that higher-income 
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households that intend to consume private education might 
purposefully locate in a low-tax, low-performance school district 
(2003a). This would work to dilute the expected Tiebout-induced 
homogeneity. Finally, in an important extension to the Tiebout model, 
Hamilton (1975) explains how Tiebout sorting would work in a system 
of property tax financing with zoning. In particular, zoning can be used 
to ensure a minimum level of housing consumption within the 
community, and therefore a minimum level of taxation. We note that 
school districts on Long Island do not have the requisite powers of 
zoning. They therefore cannot enact the exclusionary zoning necessary 
to create homogeneity. In neighboring New Jersey, school districts are 
by law coterminous with municipal governments. The landscape of 
coterminous municipal and school district borders is investigated in the 
next chapter.
Importantly, we note that the method used in this chapter finds 
sorting at the school district level when other jurisdictional boundaries 
are left out of the regression. To this author’s knowledge, no previous 
papers have attempted to investigate the sorting implications of the 
Tiebout hypothesis over multiple jurisdictional geographies 
simultaneously, and therefore no previous papers that have found 
sorting by school district have controlled for sorting occurring at other 
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geographies. More sophisticated (border-discontinuity design) 
capitalization studies have found evidence of Tiebout choice at the 
school district level, but they also find that the capitalization response 
is smaller than previous studies have estimated (Black 1999, Bayer, 
Ferreira & McMillan 2007).
The strongest evidence of sorting in this investigation is the finding 
of strong income sorting at the level of villages and suburban cities, 
small area municipal governments that control their own zoning and 
that choose which local services to provide, leaving other services to 
their encompassing towns. As already mentioned, Hamilton (1975) 
points out the importance of the zoning function to the workings of the 
Tiebout model. Villages in Nassau County can provide their own police 
force, garbage collection, road maintenance, etc., but many do not. 
They do all control their own zoning. The finding of strong income 
heterogeneity at the borders of villages suggests the possibility that 
this is due to fiscal zoning, that is, zoning designed to guarantee that 
new households pay the full marginal cost of the new level of services. 
Fiscal zoning is often discussed in the context school taxes. But (a) 
this investigation finds no support for income sorting across school 
districts, while (b) Nassau school districts do not control zoning 
anyway. How much could fiscal zoning affect income sorting across 
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villages when school taxes are charged by a different unit of 
government and other municipal services such as police and road 
maintenance are not consistently provided by the village government? 
I would like to suggest that households are consuming another kind of 
service, one not often talked about in discussions of the Tiebout model, 
but described in Tiebout’s original paper. Tiebout proposes competition 
for a fixed resource: “The factor may be the limited land area of a 
suburban community, combined with a set of zoning laws against 
apartment buildings” (Tiebout 1956:419). This suggests that 
refocussing on the demand for housing density (specifically, low 
density) may be important to further understanding the workings of 
the Tiebout model. 
This chapter demonstrates that new methods are necessary which 
are capable of characterizing sorting across multiple geographies. I 
suspect that when this or other such methods are applied to other 
study areas, local context will assert itself, and sorting by school 
district in addition to general purpose local governments will turn out 
to be important in some counties, states, or MSAs. Further, while 
research on the Tiebout model has focused on the provision of services 
like education and crime control, I think the zoning regime itself (with 
its density limits) has been underemphasized as a differentiated 
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service households value when they vote with their feet. 
99
4 Jurisdictional Homogeneity and Coterminous 
Local Government Borders: A Comparison of 
Counties in New Jersey and New York State
4.1 The Political Geography of Suburban Local  
Governments
The previous chapter discussed sorting among competing local 
government geographies, drawing attention to differences in sorting 
among municipalities and school district. Income stratification was 
apparent at the village (municipal) level in Nassau County, while racial 
sorting was the greater influence at the school district level. These 
differences are observable because the method developed exploits the 
incongruent geographies of villages and school districts in New York 
State. This raises the question of how household sorting might differ if 
the political geography were different. 
This chapter focuses on the tension between localism and 
segregation with regard to the political geography of metropolitan 
areas. The Tiebout model assumes perfect information on the part of 
residential households. In the real world households will of course not 
have perfect information, but anything that increases their knowledge 
of community taxes and services will facilitate Tiebout mobility and 
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therefore bring local public service provision closer to the efficient 
outcome. Household knowledge will be impeded by a large number of 
incongruous political and administrative boundaries for different 
services, such as school districts, fire districts, water districts, etc. 
Coterminous political boundaries may therefore aid Tiebout mobility, 
but also facilitate citizen oversight and democratic participation in local 
governance (Schwartz 2001). But anything that increases Tiebout 
mobility may also increase income and racial segregation, suggesting 
that segregation may be higher in areas with coterminous political 
borders. This hypothesis is investigated for the New York metropolitan 
area, comparing New York State counties, where municipal and school 
district boundaries have no relationship to each other, and New Jersey, 
where school district boundaries are by law coterminous with 
municipal borders. 
While local government formation is long-term endogenous, the 
relative stability of municipal and town structure in Nassau made it an 
ideal laboratory for an investigation of Tiebout sorting, as it removes a 
potentially confounding choice variable from consideration. Nassau 
County itself was formed out of the Eastern portion of Queens County 
in 1899, the year after the Western portion joined New York City. With 
regards to Nassau’s municipal structure, a review of about two dozen 
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of Nassau’s 64 villages finds most incorporations occurring in the 
1920s and virtually all occurring between 1900 and 1940. The timing 
of these incorporations in the earliest decades after New York City’s 
consolidation suggest that these are defensive incorporations in the 
same manner that the timing of the incorporations of Bronxville, 
Scarsdale, and other villages in Westchester are argued to have been a 
response to expansion by New York City and White Plains (Jackson 
1985: 152). One important feature of New York State’s Village Law is 
that villages have the power to control zoning within their borders. 
However, in response to the proliferation of villages in Nassau, a 
provision of the Nassau County charter retains zoning power at the 
town level for any villages formed after January 1, 1963 (NYS DOS 
2008: 73). In 1962, Atlantic Beach became the last village to 
incorporate before the charter change, and no villages have 
incorporated since then (NYS DOS 2008).
As for Nassau’s school districts, a first pass at an answer is 
developed by Fischel (2009), who attempts to explain regional 
variation in school district formation in the United States. Fischel 
argues that today’s suburban school districts are the result of historical 
forces, specifically the consolidation of one-room school districts 
(typically each one-room school was its own district) in the rural areas 
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that surrounded American cities prior to twentieth century 
suburbanization. The number of one-room schools declined from over 
200,000 in 1916 to “near zero” in 1972, while the number of school 
districts declined from approximately 120,000 to fewer than 20,000 
(2009: 68). The consolidation process appears to be one-way: splitting 
existing school districts is politically difficult and rare. Further, this 
process was driven by rural consolidation; while the number of school 
districts in New York State declined by 43 percent between 1960 and 
2000, the number of districts in Westchester and (importantly for our 
purposes) Nassau Counties was unchanged, as both had transitioned 
from rural to suburban counties earlier in the twentieth century. In the 
only two states for which he is able to find old school district maps 
near large cities, Fischel finds that school district boundaries show 
virtually no changes (other than a handful of consolidations) after 1926 
in Ohio or after 1938 in Illinois (2009: 214-15). While the history should 
be investigated more deeply, it appears reasonable to tentatively 
conclude that Nassau’s school districts exhibit the same decades-long 
stability as its towns and villages. 
Fischel surveys the overlap of populated area between 
municipalities and school districts for all large cities and a sample of 
smaller cities, and concludes that one-third of the urbanized population 
103
Chapter 4
of the United States live in cities that are virtually coterminous with 
“their” school districts, and an additional one-third of the population 
live in cities that “substantially overlap” with “their” school districts. 
Fischel is primarily concerned to show that the received view of school 
districts largely not conforming to municipal boundaries is more 
apparent than real. Why do the incongruent geographies of states like 
New York and Illinois differ from this norm? To address this question, it 
is useful to look at the history of local government formation in 
neighboring New Jersey. 
New Jersey is one of the states that, along with those of New 
England, has school districts that are virtually always coterminous with 
municipal boundaries (the only exception noted by Fischel being one 
where two contiguous elementary school districts share a high school). 
The law governing New Jersey’s school district boundaries was enacted 
in the context of 1890s “Borough Fever”, the rapid formation of small 
local governments in suburbanizing New Jersey. A detailed history, 
based on contemporary newspaper accounts, appeared in a newsletter 
of the Bergen County Historical Society (Wright c. 1994). Rural Bergen 
County had been increasingly settled by commuters, whose village-
centered residences shouldered increasingly larger shares of the tax 
burden of the prevailing township form of government, while the rural 
104
Chapter 4
inhabitants were leery of the threat of rising taxes due to the 
infrastructure needs of the village centers. The most significant points 
of contention were payment for paving (“macadamizing”) roads and 
building the new school buildings that the larger population required. 
Six decades before Tiebout’s watershed paper, the residents of parts of 
Bergen County argued that incorporation would allow them to retain 
“their” tax money, rather than paying for improvements elsewhere. 
School district boundaries, which were not yet required to conform 
to township boundaries, had largely remained unchanged in the 
previous two decades in spite of a 35% increase in the school 
population, and residents of the new population centers objected to 
the long distances their children had to travel to attend the rural 
schools. In February 1893, a school district covering parts of both 
Palisades Township and Midland Township was divided, and in the 
process the village of Peetzburgh voted itself a territory including the 
Hackensack Water Works, a valuable ratable. In March 1894, the 
villages of Oradell and New Milford seceded from Midland Township, 
forming the borough of Delford, and grabbing back the Water Works. 
The incorporation was immediately challenged because the new 
borough crossed township lines. In May 1894, the New Jersey State 
Legislature passed a Supplement to the Borough Act giving its 
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imprimatur to the new borders of Delford, but in the process creating a 
general enabling law that granted a seat on the County Board of 
Chosen Freeholders to new boroughs formed from territory ceded by 
two adjacent townships. In the same month, in order to address 
concerns over educational equity between rural and suburban areas, 
the legislature enacted the Township School Law, providing for 
consolidated school districts covering entire townships, but also 
requiring separate and coterminous school districts for cities, 
boroughs, and incorporated towns. Both laws would contribute to an 
explosion of borough formation. Over the following year the County 
Board of Chosen Freeholders would increase in members from 15 to 28 
as villages intentionally formed boroughs crossing township lines, and 
wealthier suburban areas circumvented the intention of the Township 
School Law by forming their own boroughs. Borough proponents openly 
acknowledged the fiscal incentive and motivating force of the 
Township School Law. In 1896 the legislature took to itself the 
authority for all new incorporations, ending the era of easy 
incorporation (Wright c. 1994). 
Wright’s account and Fischel’s account, along with what we know of 
the incorporation dates of Nassau villages, suggest a general history of 
the process of local government formation in the New York City 
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suburbs. Rural county subdivisions—towns in New York State, 
townships in New Jersey—shouldered the bulk of local government 
responsibility in the mid–1800s. These subdivisions, however, were too 
large for the daily travel of schoolchildren, and school districts were 
formed covering geographically smaller areas than townships. In the 
late 1800s, these counties experienced a large influx of commuter 
population. Smaller local governments began to form—villages in New 
York State, boroughs in New Jersey—to satisfy the public service 
demands of the wealthier suburban areas. Defensive incorporation was 
also a factor, in Nassau due to the proximity of New York City, but even 
in Bergen County, “protected” from New York City by the state line, 
defensive incorporation seems to have been motivated entirely by 
local concerns. Initially these general purpose municipalities had no 
geographic correspondence with school districts. Only in New Jersey 
did specific concerns regarding equity in educational finance between 
the poorer rural areas and the wealthier suburban areas lead to 
legislation requiring school districts to be coterminous with townships 
and municipalities. Thus, while in both Nassau and Bergen there are 
many quite small municipal governments, in Nassau the villages are 
contained within or divided across larger school districts, while in 
Bergen, to this day, there remain many extremely small schools in 
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extremely small school districts. Further, while the equalization intent 
of the Township School Law was subverted even at the time, its 
contribution to Borough Fever can be reasonably construed as 
influencing the modern landscape of educational inequality that the 
Abbott litigation addressed. 
Finally, the largely unsuccessful Township School Law is a 
contingent historical event that creates for Bergen County a local 
government geography distinct from that of Nassau County, in spite of 
the otherwise similar geohistory of suburbanization. The last chapter 
demonstrated that income and racial sorting operate over different 
local government geographies in Nassau County. The current chapter 
exploits the differing histories of New Jersey and New York to compare 
the coterminous boundaries of New Jersey with the crazy quilt 
boundaries of New York State, beginning with a comparison of Bergen 
and Nassau.
4.2 The Implications and Significance of Coterminous 
Boundaries
Investigating the impact of coterminous borders is one question 
within a broader issue of how local government structure affects 
Tiebout outcomes. The more commonly engaged question is the issue 
of fragmentation vs. consolidation. Tiebout came down on the side of 
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fragmentation, sidestepping the issue of arriving at political solutions 
to discordant preferences by proposing a system in which people 
formed political communities based on matching preferences. Tiebout 
therefore emphasized “exit” over “voice” (to put it in terms of the 
framework of Hirschman 1970), but the world in which we live has not 
abandoned voting (voice) as a mechanism for allocating local public 
services, and much urban economic research models the influence of 
voting (voice) as well as sorting (Ross, Yinger 1999). Indeed Fischel, a 
strong defender of a Tiebout-type localism, forcefully argues that 
homeowner voters (which he calls “homevoters”) are the driving force 
behind the general efficiency of small local governments (Fischel 
2001). Arguably, small government units are easier for citizen-voters to 
monitor, and local officials in small units will be more accessible and 
more responsive to voters (Ostrom, Tiebout & Warren 1961). Yet a 
Long Island Index survey of attitudes toward local government found 
that, when compared with Long Island, residents in the more 
consolidated Northern Virginia counties of Fairfax and Loudon 
expressed more positive views of local government, greater confidence 
in access to public officials, higher satisfaction in local services 
(including separately specified education and local police), and were 
more likely to rate their property taxes as a good value compared to 
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the services they receive (Center for Survey Research 2007). 
While the Long Island Index report deals with fragmentation rather 
than the issue of coterminous boundaries, some of the theoretical 
issues are similar. Ostrom, et al. (1961) argue that citizens of 
“Gargantua” (a consolidated government) may be prevented from 
exerting effective control over local public officials by the bureaucratic 
complexity of large organizations. A similar argument can be made 
with respect to geographic complexity, such as the geographic 
complexity of overlapping general and special purpose local 
governments in Nassau County, possibly a contributing factor in the 
dissatisfaction with local government services documented by the 
Long Island Index report. It could also apply to the geographic 
complexity of administrative boundaries internal to larger units of 
government. For example, Schwartz calls attention to the jumble of 
incongruous administrative boundaries within New York City, including 
32 elementary school districts, 75 police precincts, and 59 community 
districts. While conceding that each public service might have a 
different ideal size based on different economies of scale, she argues 
that citizen participation would improve if these boundaries were 
rationalized, perhaps uniting all service functions to the community 
district, even if they remain independently administered (Schwartz 
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2001). Such rationalization of boundaries need not be linked, therefore, 
to either consolidation or devolution. 
Clearly, coterminous boundaries are relevant to the Tiebout model. 
On the one hand, if coterminous boundaries force services with wildly 
different scale economies into like-sized units, they could undermine 
Tiebout efficiency. Conversely, by increasing household access to 
information, coterminous boundaries should promote efficiency, in 
either a voting (Fischel-type) interpretation of the model or a sorting 
interpretation of the model. The advantages for a pure sorting model 
are perhaps greater, as it might be hypothesized that the cost of 
information is higher to the nonresident mover choosing among 
several possible communities than to the situated resident. The 
investigation of the last chapter, which concluded that income is more 
important to choice among general purpose local governments while 
race is more important to choice among school districts, raises the 
question of how racial and income sorting will interact in the presence 
of coterminous local government borders. The next section 
investigates the hypothesis that racial and income sorting will reinforce 
each other, leading to greater racial and income stratification in states 




4.3 Empirical Investigation of Coterminous Borders
The previous chapter tested one aspect of the Tiebout model by 
investigating socioeconomic sorting across differing local government 
in Queens and Nassau Counties, New York. This included general 
purpose local governments such counties, cities, towns (subcounty 
divisions), and villages (municipalities), as well as one particularly 
important special purpose local government, namely, school districts. 
Remember that city and town are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, 
i.e., all New York State land is part of a city or a town, but not both. 
Remember also that towns may contain villages, but some town area is 
not within any village. Villages control their own zoning, but they may 
choose whether to provide their own public services, such as road 
maintenance, trash collection, and local police, or whether to contract 
with the encompassing town to provide these services. The empirical 
investigation exploited the incongruity of these various local 
government boundaries to look for evidence of heterogeneity (or 
segregation) across these boundaries. The results indicated that 
income is a significant factor in sorting across municipal boundaries, 
but support for income sorting across school district boundaries was 
ambiguous: border heterogeneity was significant for only one of three 
alternative measures of income inequality, and the magnitude of the 
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effect was small compared with municipal border heterogeneity. 
Models of racial heterogeneity lacked explanatory power, but contrary 
to the income models, school districts rather than municipalities were 
the boundaries of significance. The plausible hypothesis that 
households would also sort by family structure, specifically that 
households with children would tend to separate from childless 
households, particularly with respect to school districts, was 
unsupported, and is not investigated in this chapter. 
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Table 4.1: Bergen–Queens Income and Racial Sorting
Dependent Variable:
Independent Variables: Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
(Intercept) 2.751*** 0.015*** 6451.096*** 0.172***
(0.096) (0.001) (378.852) (0.004)
Jurisdictional municipality 1.097*** 0.022*** 4078.435*** 0.028***
Borders (0.161) (0.002) (637.219) (0.008)
Spatial distance_km 1.703*** 0.022*** 10183.546*** 0.032**
Interaction (0.213) (0.003) (841.504) (0.010)
Measures distance_km2 -0.182** -0.004*** -1269.346*** -0.009**
(0.063) (0.001) (246.842) (0.003)
Other suburban 0.094 0.005** 3479.066*** 0.012*
Variables (0.108) (0.002) (425.130) (0.005)
adj. R-squared 0.056 0.061 0.131 0.011
F 93.956 101.169 235.327 17.888
N 6221 6221 6221 6221


















* Significant at p < 0.1
** Significant at p < 0.05
*** Significant at p < 0.01
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In New Jersey, townships historically fulfilled the same function as 
New York State towns, as subcounty governments (minor civil 
divisions) that bore primary responsibility for service provision. Each 
county would be composed of several townships, which would provide 
infrastructure such as roads and streetlights. Boroughs, as small 
municipalities that tended to form around clusters of population and 
commerce, can be roughly equated to New York State villages. 
However, in New Jersey, when a borough forms, its territory actually 
secedes from the township it was formerly a part of. (There are other 
possible forms of government as well, but the township and borough 
forms are the most common.) No territory in New Jersey is 
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Table 4.2: Bergen–Nassau Income-Based Sorting
Dependent Variable:
t-Statistic (Heteroscedastic)
Independent Variables: Model 5A Model 5B Model 6A Model 6B Model 7A Model 7B
(Intercept) 2.268*** 2.258*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 9367.965*** 10337.043***
(0.154) (0.160) (0.003) (0.003) (769.636) (794.670)
Jurisdictional municipality 1.924*** 1.933*** 0.039*** 0.037*** 15343.786*** 14513.988***
Borders (0.189) (0.193) (0.003) (0.003) (944.216) (958.384)
sdsec -0.536* -0.523* -0.008* -0.011** -1426.374 -2693.393*
(0.225) (0.231) (0.004) (0.004) (1120.927) (1149.993)
nassau_town 1.702*** 1.712*** 0.028*** 0.026*** 3498.13 2586.708
(0.369) (0.371) (0.006) (0.006) (1840.895) (1847.302)
Spatial distance_km 2.116*** 2.114*** 0.033*** 0.034*** 9219.700*** 9434.202***
Interaction (0.260) (0.260) (0.004) (0.004) (1296.073) (1294.365)
Measures distance_km2 -0.192* -0.192* -0.006*** -0.006*** 208.795 167.713
(0.081) (0.081) (0.001) (0.001) (401.566) (400.887)
municipality x sdsec 0.402 0.371 0.005 0.011 -6740.768*** -3813.276*
(0.319) (0.342) (0.005) (0.006) (1590.550) (1702.433)
Other new_jersey 0.028 -0.005** -2708.892***
Variables (0.114) (0.002) (569.023)
adj. R-squared 0.11 0.11 0.104 0.105 0.145 0.148
F 116.945 100.23 109.799 95.476 160.122 141.015
N 5622 5622 5617 5617 5622 5622
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Theil Inequality (Ratio of 
Between-Group to Total)
Absolute Difference of 
Median Income
* Significant at p < 0.1
** Significant at p < 0.05
*** Significant at p < 0.01
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unincorporated, all territory is part of exactly one municipal 
government, and in spite of differences in form (e.g. “strong mayor” vs 
council-manager), there is no difference in the powers of different 
classes of municipality (Cerra 2007). Finally, as discussed earlier, 
because of the Township School Law, New Jersey school districts are 
coterminous with municipalities. It is this fact which motivates the 
investigation of the present chapter. The working hypothesis is that 
when school district and municipal borders are coterminous, racial and 
income sorting will reinforce each other, leading to higher degrees of 
racial segregation and income segregation in New Jersey than in New 
York. 
In the first stage, the hypothesis is investigated comparing Bergen 
County, New Jersey, to Nassau County, New York. Bergen County is 
chosen as the best match among the candidate Northern New Jersey 
counties. Nassau County is a heavily urbanized suburban county, with 
a 2000 population of 1.3 million, and a population density of almost 
4700 persons per square mile. At 880,000 persons, Bergen County is 
the most populous Northern New Jersey County, and has a similar 
population density (3800 persons per square mile). It is also 
demographically similar, with a population that is 72% White non-
Hispanic, 5% Black, 10% Hispanic, and 11% Asian, compared to 74% / 
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10% / 10% / 5% for Nassau County. Other candidate counties are more 
urban (denser) and too different demographically (Hudson County 
includes Jersey City and is 40% Hispanic, Essex County includes 
Newark and is 40% Black). Following the Nassau–Bergen comparison, 
all suburban New York State counties are compared with all New Jersey 
counties of the New York–Northern New Jersey–Long Island CMSA . 
This investigation relies on data from the 2000 Census on household 
income and householder race by block group and by county. The 
method developed Chapter 3 is applied to the comparison of Bergen 
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Table 4.3: Bergen–Nassau Racial Sorting
Dependent Variable:
Independent Variables: Model 7A Model 7B Model 8A Model 8B Model 9A Model 9B
(Intercept) 0.202*** 0.192*** 0.218*** 0.232*** 0.219*** 0.236***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Jurisdictional municipality 0.036** 0.045*** 0.021* 0.009 0.014 -0.001
Borders (0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
sdsec 0.034* 0.047** 0.045*** 0.027* 0.070*** 0.048***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
nassau_town 0.035 0.045 0.034 0.021 0.036* 0.02
(0.023) (0.023) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Spatial distance_km 0.081*** 0.079*** 0.030* 0.033** 0.018 0.022
Interaction (0.016) (0.016) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Measures distance_km2 -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.010* -0.010** -0.011** -0.011**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
municipality x sdsec -0.008 -0.037 -0.041** 0.001 -0.038* 0.014
(0.020) (0.021) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016)
Other new_jersey 0.027*** -0.039*** -0.048***
Variables (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
adj. R-squared 0.017 0.02 0.007 0.016 0.016 0.029
F 17.554 17.152 7.987 14.154 16.003 25.051
N 5622 5622 5622 5622 5622 5622
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
White/Black Index of 
Dissimilarity
White/Hispanic Index of 
Dissimilarity
Top Two Groups Index of 
Dissimilarity
* Significant at p < 0.1
** Significant at p < 0.05
*** Significant at p < 0.01
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and Nassau Counties. Each OLS regression is set up with a dependent 
variable representing heterogeneity—that is, representing the strength 
of the difference between the populations of the neighboring block 
groups—and independent variables representing jurisdictional 
boundaries and other likely influences on heterogeneity. Household 
incomes in neighboring block groups are used to calculate two 
measures of difference: the t-statistic and the Theil inequality index. 
The t-statistic is a variance-adjusted difference of means with a 
straightforward interpretation. Not only does a greater absolute 
difference in mean incomes affect t plausibly (making it increase), but 
more homogeneous populations have a smaller income variance, 
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Table 4.4: Inequality, New Jersey vs. New York 
Suburban Counties
Dependent Variable:
Independent Variables: Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
(Intercept) 0.608*** 0.410*** 0.058**
(0.050) (0.051) (0.016)
new_jersey 0.007 0.048 0.01
(0.062) (0.062) (0.020)
F 0.012 0.59 0.246
p 0.914 0.452 0.626













* Significant at p < 0.1
** Significant at p < 0.05
*** Significant at p < 0.01
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which again yields an increased t-statistic. An alternative measure of 
difference is the commonly used Theil inequality index. This measure is 
decomposable into within-group and between-group inequality. 
Following a previous investigation of Tiebout sorting by Eberts and 
Gronberg (1981), heterogeneity is expressed as the ratio of between-
group inequality to the total inequality of the paired block groups. 
Finally, both of these income heterogeneity measures are compared 
with the computationally easier difference of median incomes, based 
on the block group median income reported by the Census Bureau. 
In order to measure racial and ethnic segregation, D, the well-
known index of dissimilarity, is used (Kaplan, Holloway 1998). The 
categories used are Hispanics of any race, and racial groups excluding 
Hispanics (i.e., White means White non-Hispanic, Black means Black 
non-Hispanic, etc.). D can only measure segregation between two 
demographic groups. For this study, D is calculated for White/Black 
segregation, White/Hispanic segregation, and segregation between the 
two most populous racial/ethnic groups in each block group pair. 
Most of the independent variables are dummy variables 
representing whether the block group boundary coincides with a 
jurisdictional border. The borders being investigated include the 
borders of school districts, towns (county subareas in Nassau County), 
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and suburban municipalities (which includes cities and villages in 
Nassau, boroughs and townships in Bergen). Most of the school 
districts in the study area are unified school districts. Elementary 
school district borders are not included in the analysis.
Independent variables are selected that might plausibly influence 
heterogeneity across block group boundaries. Of primary importance is 
controlling for spatial interaction, the way that spatial characteristics of 
the local area influence the interaction between neighboring 
populations. Distance between the block group centroids (geometric 
centers of mass) is the measure used. Spatial interaction may not 
decline linearly with distance, so distance may be raised to a power. 
Distance squared yields a so-called gravity model. Often, both distance 
and distance squared will be included so that spatial interaction may 
be allowed to vary in intensity and sign as distance changes. F-tests 
indicate that models with both distance variables perform better than 
models with only one or the other. 
OLS regression is first applied to Bergen County to confirm 
socioeconomic sorting across municipal/school district borders. A 
problem with previous research is that jurisdictional sorting has not 
controlled for sorting absent political fragmentation. Queens County is 
included in the regression, as it was in comparison with Nassau, so that 
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the regression presents jurisdictional heterogeneity against a baseline 
that combines urban and suburban populations. The three measures of 
income inequality and the measure of racial/ethnic segregation are 
calculated at census block group boundaries, and regressed on a 
dummy variable indicating a municipal border, controlling for expected 
spatial interaction and suburban location. In this regression, there is 
only one local government dummy variable, since New Jersey 
municipalities are coterminous with school districts and, as previously 
explained, are nonoverlapping and have the same powers whether 
their legal form is borough, township, or city. The results, presented in 
Table 4.1, show that the combined municipal/school district boundary 
variable is significant in both income and racial heterogeneity 
regressions, indicating that both aspects of sorting are operative 
across borders of New Jersey local governments. The magnitude of the 
effect is, however, smaller than in the Nassau–Queens investigation, 
and the explanatory power (adjusted R²) of each model is lower than 
the analogous model for Nassau–Queens (compare with Tables 3.2 and 
3.3). 
Next, the method is applied to a regression of boundary 
heterogeneity in Nassau and Bergen Counties. In this model, Nassau 
villages and cities are treated as equivalent to Bergen boroughs and 
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townships. Nassau towns enter the regression independently, with no 
New Jersey equivalent. Secondary school districts are another 
explanatory variable, but remember that in Bergen, secondary school 
borders always coincide with municipal borders. The hypothesis of 
mutually reinforcing sorting is investigated by adding an interaction 
term for the municipal and school district borders. For most block 
group boundaries, the value of the interaction term is 1 if the boundary 
coincides with both a municipal border and a secondary school district 
border, 0 if either or both of the municipal variable or the school 
district variable are 0. In an additional series of models, a dummy 
variable indicates New Jersey boundaries, to control for whether 
Bergen or Nassau have pervasively higher heterogeneity. 
The results, reported in Table 4.2, are not favorable to the 
hypothesis. The interaction term, municipality x sdsec, is not 
significant in the models relying on the t-statistic and the Theil 
Inequality Index as the measures of income heterogeneity. In the 
model that uses difference in median income, the interaction term is 
significant but of the wrong sign, indicating lower income 
heterogeneity across boundaries which are both municipal and school 
district borders. The dummy variable representing location in New 
Jersey is not significant in the model which uses the t-statistic, and 
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while significant in the other two income models it indicates lower 
general income heterogeneity in Bergen than in Nassau. The difference 
in median income variable is right-skewed, and large residuals are 
found around known high-income enclaves on the North shore of 
Nassau County and along the Palisades in Bergen county. Residuals 
are uncorrelated with the state dummy variable, so in spite of 
generally larger spatial inequality in Nassau, the model is not 
consistently underpredicting border heterogeneity there in comparison 
with Bergen. 
The investigation of racial sorting, reported in Table 4.3, is similarly 
unfavorable, moreso because the models have very little explanatory 
power (which was true of the Queens–Nassau models reported in Table 
3.3). The interaction term is not significant for the White/Black index of 
dissimilarity, and for White/Hispanic dissimilarity and the index of 
dissimilarity among the top two racial/ethnic groups, the sign indicates 
lower dissimilarity where borders coincide. The New Jersey dummy 
variable does indicate pervasively higher White/Black dissimilarity in 
Bergen, though interpreting this result is complicated by the opposite 
(though insignificant) sign for combined municipal/school district 
borders. Indices of dissimilarity for White/Hispanic and top two groups 
are pervasively lower in Bergen. Residuals were examined for the 
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study area. There was no obvious spatial patterning, and in particular 
no correlation with the New Jersey dummy variable. In spite of a small 
but significantly different pattern of racial/ethnic segregation 
(White/Black dissimilarity is approximately 0.02 higher in New Jersey, 
while White/Hispanic and top two groups dissimilarity are 
approximately 0.04 lower), there is no discernible impact in the 
residuals of the border heterogeneity models.
While the conjunction of municipal and school district boundaries 
does not seem to increase to increase heterogeneity at the local scale, 
the possibility remains that wider scale segregation will be facilitated 
by this political geography. Since municipal and school district borders 
are everywhere coterminous in New Jersey, but not in New York, Theil 
Inequality Indices and indices of dissimilarity are computed for 21 
suburban counties in the New York-Northern New Jersey Metropolitan 
Area (that is, all counties except the five boroughs of New York City), 
and ANOVA is performed on the counties grouped by state. The F-
statistics, reported in Table 4.4, indicate that there is no significant 
difference in either income or racial sorting across counties in the two 
states.
4.4 Discussion and Conclusion
The hypothesis of this investigation of the impact of coterminous 
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local governments on income, racial, and ethnic sorting is decisively 
rejected. The comparison of Bergen and Queens seems to be 
influenced by Nassau’s extremely high levels of income sorting. 
Bergen’s income sorting is much lower to begin with (compare the 
coefficients in Table 4.1 and 3.2). Since Bergen municipal and school 
district borders are all coterminous, while a large majority of Nassau’s 
borders are not, coterminous borders as a class will appear to be less 
heterogeneous than single-scale borders. Thus, for one measure of 
income sorting (absolute difference in median income), the sign of the 
coefficient is negative. But for the other two measures, the coefficient 
is not even statistically significant. 
If the result is dominated by Nassau’s high degree of spatial 
inequality, a more favorable result might be obtained for a larger class 
of counties. But a simple comparison of county-level inequality and 
segregation between New York and New Jersey counties also yielded 
no statistically significant results. A version of the regression (not 
reported) looking at all counties from all metropolitan areas in New 
York and New Jersey was tried, and also failed to reject the null. The 
impact of coterminous boundaries remains interesting and important. 
Going forward, what is needed is a clearer theoretical understanding of 
the expected effects of coterminous borders, testable hypotheses, and 
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the application of the current method and new methods to more states 
over a wider geographical area. 
What lessons can be drawn from these negative results? In the next 
chapter, I will discuss the benefits of the rationalization of jurisdictional 
and administrative boundaries. One of the central criticisms of the 
Tiebout model is that it is believed to create or exacerbate economic 
and racial segregation. My working hypothesis was that income and 
racial segregation would be mutually reinforcing, and therefore larger, 
in areas with coterminous local governments. While the pure theory of 
the Tiebout model might view this outcome as just another 
manifestation of consumer preference, those who are already 
suspicious of the Tiebout model, or those who value its efficiency 
effects but recognize its contribution to racial segregation, might see 
coterminous borders as making a bad system worse. The negative 
results of the present investigation suggest that this concern is 
misplaced. Therefore if we have good reasons to promote the drawing 
of coterminous local government borders (and what those reasons 
might be will be discussed in the conclusion), the present investigation 
rejects one potential criticism of such a policy.
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5 Concluding Remarks
5.1 Summary of the Empirical Investigation
As stated in the introduction, the Tiebout model generates claims 
regarding empirical validity, efficiency, and policy. The primary 
empirical claim to have been investigated is whether households 
(adequately) take local government services into account in deciding 
where to live. If certain assumptions are satisfied, such as perfect 
knowledge and costless mobility, the resulting outcome is claimed to 
be efficient. If efficient, meeting the assumptions of the model is taken 
to be a reasonable policy goal. Missing in most discussions of Tiebout 
is an explicit ethical dimension. I have therefore discussed principles of 
spatial justice, focusing on how specifically local public services affect 
the distribution of resources in a society, and how the principles of 
justice and the federal structure of public service provision must 
influence each other. In the current, concluding chapter, I seek to tie 
these threads together in a discussion of the values in and the value of 
a Tiebout-inspired, justice-constrained localism. To begin with, let me 
summarize my empirical findings. 
The Tiebout model implies that households will sort into jurisdictions 
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based on preferences for local public services. While Tiebout assumed 
for purposes of exposition that income was unrelated to residential 
location, we do no great violence to the model by assuming that the 
household exercises choice over a labor market, which is basically how 
the United States Census Bureau defines a metropolitan statistical 
area. Actual household preferences are unobservable, but if 
preferences are correlated with observable characteristics such as 
income or race/ethnicity, populations should be socioeconomically 
more homogeneous within local government units than within the 
encompassing metropolitan area. Previous investigations of this 
implication are suspect because they have failed to account for a 
statistical artifact and for spatial dependence in the data. The 
statistical artifact is that smaller populations will be more 
homogeneous than larger populations. A finding of increased 
homogeneity for smaller municipalities is therefore not evidence of a 
causal relationship, and not evidence of Tiebout sorting. Furthermore, 
because of spatial dependence in socioeconomic data, randomly 
delineated areas will exhibit some homogeneity, and smaller areas will 
usually exhibit more homogeneity. Consider median income: In 
Chapter 3, Moran’s I confirmed significant clustering (p < 0.01) of 
census tracts by median household income in Queens and Nassau 
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Counties, New York. If nearer census tracts have more similar 
household incomes, then smaller jurisdictions, i.e. those composed of 
nearer census tracts, will be more internally homogeneous than larger 
jurisdictions, i.e. those composed of more spatially distant (though 
usually still contiguous) census tracts. Thus an often-used approach to 
empirically corroborating an important assumption of the Tiebout 
model is biased toward its conclusion. 
In Chapter 3, a new method is proposed, inspired by capitalization 
studies examining home prices across jurisdictional borders, that 
correlates socioeconomic discontinuities with jurisdictional borders. 
This method is able to weigh the relative importance of different kinds 
of jurisdictional borders. Heterogeneity is quantified between all pairs 
of contiguous census block groups in Queens and Nassau Counties, 
New York. Income heterogeneity is calculated using three alternative 
measures: the heteroscedastic t-statistic (a variance-corrected 
difference of means), the between-group Theil inequality index, and 
the absolute difference of median incomes. Racial/ethnic heterogeneity 
and heterogeneity of family structure (presence of children) is 
calculated using D, the well-known index of dissimilarity. D is 
calculated for White-Black dissimilarity, White-Hispanic dissimilarity, 
and dissimilarity between the top two racial/ethnic groups in each 
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block group pair. For family structure, D is calculated using households 
with and without children as the two groups. Each of these 
heterogeneity measures is used as the dependent variable in 
regressions with explanatory variables representing jurisdictional 
borders, controlling for suburban location and spatial interaction. Block 
group pairs are coded 1 if they fall in different general purpose local 
governments, 0 if they don’t. While block groups align precisely with 
general purpose local government boundaries, they do not align with 
school district boundaries. The variable indicating a school district 
boundary is therefore coded based on the percentage of school district 
population exclusive to each block group. This also reduces to 0 or 1 in 
the case of a single school district encompassing both block groups (0) 
or a school district border which exactly matches the block group 
boundary (1), but it may vary between 0 and 1 if a block group’s 
population partially falls into the same school district as its neighboring 
block group, and partially does not. Queens County, a jurisdictionally 
unified borough of New York City, is included in the regression so that 
border heterogeneity will be tested against a baseline which includes 
households not choosing among different jurisdictions. 
The regressions indicate that households sort among municipalities 
by income, but sort among school districts by race and ethnicity. The 
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absolute value of the difference in median annual income is more than 
$18,000 higher (p < 0.01) in block group pairs which straddle village 
(municipal) borders than for the average block group pair. An 
important contribution of this study is the finding that income 
heterogeneity between school districts is largely an artifact of the 
failure to account for the sorting effects of multiple levels of 
government. School district border heterogeneity appears statistically 
significant (p < 0.01) in regressions which omit the borders of general 
purpose local governments (villages, towns, and cities), but this effect 
completely disappears when the full complement of explanatory 
variables is introduced. This behavior applies to all three alternative 
measures of income inequality. Racial/ethnic heterogeneity is higher 
across school district boundaries for three different race/ethnicity 
pairs. Dissimilarity between the top two groups in each block group 
pair is 0.069 higher (on a 0 to 1 scale, p < 0.01) for a block group pair 
which is divided by a school district boundary. Village (municipal) 
boundaries are only significant for White-Black dissimilarity, increasing 
D by 0.059 over a block group pair not divided by a village boundary. 
However, the explanatory power of the race/ethnicity models are 
weak. Family structure (presence of children) is found to not be 
influenced by municipal or school district borders. 
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I attribute the finding of income sorting at the municipal level to 
control over zoning, which gives municipal governments considerable 
power to employ exclusionary zoning to control the price of access to a 
community. Nassau school districts do not have power over zoning, 
which means they cannot employ exclusionary zoning to control entry. 
Further, as education is also privately available, there is less incentive 
for income-based sorting over school districts (Nechyba 2003b). The 
finding of racial sorting is consistent with established research 
indicating that race is a significant driver in household choice of 
schools (Hamilton, Guin 2005). While much of the previous literature 
suggests that households are choosing school districts based on 
quality, these results suggest a more complicated story. First, racial 
sorting seems to be operative without school districts having control 
over zoning. Second, income sorting may be desired as its own end, 
regardless of access to particular schools. Third, zoning itself , or 
perhaps the direct effects of zoning such as lower residential density or 
the qualitative aspects of planning, may be a service which households 
value, rather than the indirect effect of zoning on the socioeconomic 
makeup of the jurisdiction.
The findings of Chapter 3 are possible because of the lack of 
correspondence among municipal and school district boundaries in 
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New York State. In neighboring New Jersey, municipal and school 
district boundaries are by law required to be coterminous. A natural 
experiment suggests itself in investigating the impact of coterminous 
boundaries on household sorting. The Tiebout model assumes perfect 
information on the part of mobile households. While this assumption 
will not be met in practice, it stands to reason that coterminous 
borders will increase the accessibility of information. I hypothesized 
that racial and income sorting would be mutually reinforcing, leading 
to greater spatial segregation along both dimensions in New Jersey 
than in New York. The empirical investigation of Chapter 4 did not 
support the hypothesis. Income and racial sorting were not higher 
along the combined municipal/school district borders of Bergen 
County, New Jersey, than along the primarily unidimensional borders of 
Nassau; and overall inequality/segregation in the New Jersey counties 
than in the New York counties of the New York–Northern New Jersey–
Long Island Metropolitan Statistical Area. However, it is important to 
stress that the regressions do confirm income and racial sorting across 
jurisdictional borders within Bergen County, though the effect is not as 
pronounced as in Nassau County. Since municipal and school district 
boundaries have been stable for decades in both Nassau and Bergen, I 
conclude that the population patterns have emerged through 
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deliberate choice among local government jurisdictions, supporting an 
important assumption of the Tiebout model. 
5.2 Spatialized Justice in the Fragmented Urban 
System
Household sorting can be viewed as undesirable in its own right—
that is, as a form of exclusion—or as indicative of households making 
choices regarding public services. The fragmented American 
metropolis can therefore be viewed as affording more choices and 
therefore higher household utility, or as contributing to racial 
segregation and spatial inequality. The central argument in favor of 
facilitating Tiebout choice is the claim that the resulting distribution is 
efficient. This claim engenders a certain complacency with regards to 
socioeconomic segregation, and can be interpreted, as Harvey 
suggests much of location theory can be, as a mere ad hoc justification 
for the status quo. Yet what is the value of this efficiency? Remember 
that an efficient outcome, in the economist’s sense, merely means a 
situation in which no one can made better off without someone being 
made worse off. As discussed in Chapter 2, Rawls prioritizes equity 
over efficiency. Using the example of serfdom, he argues that even 
though some people (feudal landholders) will be hurt in the transition 
to free labor, this is no argument against transitioning to a more 
133
Chapter 5
equitable distribution (the abolition of serfdom). The Pareto efficiency 
concept is therefore inherently conservative, as it is probably very 
difficult to change anything in a way which does not hurt someone. 
The Pareto efficiency concept is therefore of exceedingly limited use 
in actual policy evaluation (Hausman, McPherson 2006). Even if the 
outcome is efficient, we may look at the obvious inequalities written in 
the concrete, glass, asphalt, and steel of the urban landscape and 
agree with Smith (1994) that the worst-off cannot reasonably be 
considered to be as well-off as they can be. The basic structure of a 
society, according to Rawls, includes its governance structure, 
taxation, concept of family, etc. To account for a basic structure that 
allows (or discourages) the manifestation of inequality in a specifically 
urban form, we must also include the following as elements of the 
basic structure: land planning regime (locally controlled in the United 
States), metropolitan political structure (divided between city and 
suburb, and fragmented within suburbs), typical local revenue sources 
(primarily property taxes with significant intergovernmental transfers), 
and typical local government functions (which in the United States 
includes education). The result is a basic structure with a high degree 
of local control of those government functions which most heavily 
influence the well-being of the nation’s citizens. 
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Does this mean that Rawls would reject this basic structure? Rawls 
argues for redistribution at the level of a national polity. In this, he 
would be backed up by public finance economists who have typically 
argued that redistribution at the local level is too easily avoided by the 
emigration of the wealthy or overburdened by the immigration of the 
poor. In its focus on local public goods, the Tiebout model is primarily 
focused on the allocation branch of government—that is, allocating 
resources towards goods which would be underprovided by the 
market. If Tiebout sorting leads to efficiency in public goods provision, 
redistribution could take place at the national level, in terms of cash or 
in-kind transfers, or through intergovernmental grants which provide 
additional resources to the worst-off areas. In the American context, 
this would primarily involve providing grants to central cities which 
would be financed by suburban residents, though some redistribution 
among suburbs would be necessary as well. 
A problem with this somewhat simple solution based on traditional 
public finance theory is that even after the monetary redistribution has 
taken place, because of the problem of neighborhood effects, the poor 
households or the poor regions (central cities) will still not be better off 
than they would be under strict equality. That is, the difference 
principle will not have been satisfied. The amount of redistribution 
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necessary to satisfy the difference principle may be so large—recall 
Betts and Roemer’s estimate of nine times the per capita educational 
expenditure to offset the burden of being Black in the United States 
(Betts, Roemer 2007)—as to seriously distort allocative efficiency, 
compromise the individual incentive to work, and distort the residential 
location decision (particularly if the tax burden or benefits were based 
to some degree on geography). It seems that the basic structure must 
involve not only a redistributive tax system, but some way of 
promoting socioeconomic integration or otherwise preventing wide 
disparities in the quality of local public services. What might a planner 
capture the efficiencies of the Tiebout model while conforming to the 
demands of the difference principle? 
Tiebout suggests three policies to facilitate the operation of the 
model: information, persistence, and fragmentation. Since the model 
requires full knowledge of taxes and services among the various local 
governments, the government should publicize such information. In 
the case of services, publicizing of service quality is a movement that 
is gathering steam, partially through political effort, as with the 
grading of schools in New York City, and partially through the 
increased access to information made available by the internet. This 
policy can also be commended for its contribution to democratic 
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control and oversight, not just in the process of household relocation. It 
seems relatively uncontroversial. An additional recommendation is the 
persistence of local government spending patterns. Most consumer 
durables do not change after purchase (except for expected wear and 
tear), but a house becomes, in a sense, a different product if the local 
government changes its allocation decision, introducing (or 
eliminating) a specific tax or a specific service. So Tiebout suggests 
that local governments be required to maintain existing tax and 
service packages. This idea has not been pursued in the literature and 
seems undemocratic and just plain bizarre. Just because we hope to 
capture the efficiencies of competitive markets does not mean that we 
should try to force public goods to be something they can never be. 
Tiebout’s main suggestion is to facilitate choice by providing a large 
number of communities from which to choose. Thus, he supports a 
fragmented intraurban political landscape. Because of the obvious 
inequalities between cities and suburbs, as well as because of the 
desire for regional planning, a contrary literature recommends 
metropolitan consolidation (Rusk 2003). There are certainly differences 
among communities that households might legitimately choose, such 
as the desire for natural amenities such as beaches and open space. 
The Tiebout model is motivated by the idea that households ought not 
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to pay for the preferences of their neighbors, and even Harvey (1973) 
tepidly endorses sorting by consumer preferences. Rawls does as well, 
though without considering the spatiality of service delivery. He 
proposes that after government has provided public goods needed by 
all, and fulfilled the redistribution goals required by the difference 
principle, another branch of government (the “exchange branch”) 
should use benefit taxation—taxation that falls on the party that enjoys 
the service—to provide for goods not uniformly demanded by the 
population (Rawls 1971: 249-250). Although Rawls’ spaceless theory 
suggests that this function could be provided by a national assembly, 
the Tiebout model suggests instead that this function be provided by a 
system of competing local governments. Therefore, it seems that 
Rawls could endorse a separation of city and suburb if each area 
provides a unique set of public goods. 
But the goods differently available must not conflict with the 
demands of justice. While Rawls sees this as a two-stage process, 
where first we provide the public goods demanded by justice, and then 
we provide the public goods demanded by differing segments of the 
population, it could instead be conceived as a two-scale process. As a 
first pass, consider central provision of those goods demanded by 
justice, and local provision of those goods whose availability does not 
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impact a just distribution. We would still need to evaluate educational 
provision in light of the difference principle. Would central provision 
benefit the worst-off? The experience of California suggests that it 
might not. When California, like other states, faced education funding 
equalization following the Serrano decision, California voters 
responded by passing Proposition 13 in 1978 , placing limits on local 
property taxes. California’s local school systems became increasingly 
dependent upon state transfers (primarily funded through state-level 
income taxes). But the primary result over subsequent decades was 
not to “equalize up”, but to reduce the overall quality of California’s 
public schools (Brunner, Sonstelie 2006). 
Does the current system of local provision benefit the worst-off? 
Hoxby finds that greater Tiebout choice (a higher Herfindahl of school 
districts enrollment as a proportion of total metropolitan enrollment) 
leads to higher productivity, because of both higher student 
achievement and lower costs. These benefits extend to lower-income 
and Black and Hispanic students, although the effect is not as large as 
for higher-income and White students. Alternative interpretations 
include that the choice measure is dominated by choice of 
nondisadvantaged students, or that the choice has both benefits and 
harms for disadvantaged students, the negative effects partially 
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offsetting the benefits (Hoxby 2000). This latter interpretation would 
be consistent with negative peer group effects and the harmful impact 
of racial segregation (Mickelson 2003). Rothstein challenges Hoxby’s 
conclusion by focusing on the extent to which parental choice may be 
dominated by peer group choice, which is highly correlated with school 
performance (2004). 
In sum, it seems unclear whether more centralized or decentralized 
provision would benefit disadvantaged students. But a system where 
education is primarily funded and controlled at the local level would be 
unlikely to satisfy the needs of the difference principle. A solution must 
include policies both to promote socioeconomic integration and to 
correct the “special difficulties stemming from the social environment” 
in the form of transferring additional resources to impoverished 
communities. While primarily concerned with the orthodox economists’ 
approach to efficiency and welfare, Schwab and Oates (1991) propose 
that intergovernmental transfers would have the effect not only of 
compensating for the added costs of educating lower SES students, but 
would lead to increased integration because higher-income 
communities would be more willing to accept lower-income residents 
(students) because of the added funds such students bring with them. 
That is, a community could choose to enact exclusionary zoning, but 
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they would pay the price in terms of their tax transfers to communities 
with lower average incomes. A community that enacted a policy of 
inclusionary zoning would reduce or eliminate their tax export. They 
would still have to pay local taxes, but those taxes would be directed 
locally, and supplemented by transfers from other localities. Thought 
their approach entirely sidesteps the equity issue, it is entirely 
consistent with the spatialized Rawlsian approach developed here. 
Finally, any discussions of the basic structure and of 
intergovernmental transfers must consider the source of tax revenue. 
Property taxes remain historically important specifically for financing 
local government in general as well as for education specifically. 
Income taxes are important at the national level. Rawls briefly 
discusses some alternatives, including a progressive consumption tax 
(Frank 2007 provides a recent statement). My own view is that Thomas 
Paine’s (1796) and Henry George’s (1879) argument about the 
relationship between land ownership and inequality is correct, and that 
George’s proposed solution of a high tax on land rents, with central 
redistribution of the funds, is consistent with Schwab and Oates 
welfare analysis and would also satisfy the demands of the spatialized 
difference principle. With this background, specific policies for 
metropolitan structure and government funding are discussed in the 
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next section. I will argue the advantages of local control with fiscal 
equalization.
5.3 Policy Implications
The most common policy question which emerges from the Tiebout 
literature is the issue of consolidation versus fragmentation. When 
Borough Fever was in swing in Bergen County, New York City was only 
a few years away from forming the largest American local government 
jurisdiction through consolidation. Consolidation during this period was 
driven by a belief that size mattered, and that economies of scale 
would lead to more efficient urban governance (Jackson 1985). In 
addition to economies of scale, regionalists have focused on the 
necessity for regional planning, e.g. for transportation systems, as well 
as on the impact on spatial inequality, particularly between lower-
income central cities and higher-income suburbs (Orfield 1997). 
Against this, Tiebout saw his model as a defense of fragmentation, but 
he did realize the necessity to account for economies of scale (1956). 
The primary gains in a Tiebout landscape come from the sorting into 
relatively homogeneous jurisdictions of households with similar 
preferences, and this seems like a fair, perhaps even unavoidable 
manner for distributing access to locationally fixed amenities. 
Throughout the literature in urban geography, planning, public 
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finance, and ethics, two almost naturally important spatial scales 
appear over and over. Those scales are the metropolitan area and the 
neighborhood. The metropolitan area might be defined as a labor 
market or a production agglomeration. It is the area over which 
Tiebout choice might operate, in that a household may locate 
anywhere in the metropolitan area and get to employment in the 
region’s core. Neighborhoods are small, relatively homogeneous areas. 
They might be defined in terms of face-to-face contact, or the daily 
mobility of the nonemployed, or the relationship to a central amenity 
such as a community center or park. But each neighborhood has a 
character, for good or ill, which people in other neighborhoods will be 
aware of. In a sense, regionalists might argue that the entire 
metropolitan area is the most natural political unit (although most 
contemporary regionalists, recognizing the political unfeasibility of 
such a goal, will offer less encompassing measures), while localists 
might argue that the neighborhood is the most natural political unit. 
Yet neither scale can be conceived without the other. Large central 
cities like New York are informally divided into neighborhoods and 
formally divided into administrative districts, while the residents of the 
suburbs of Long Island participate in the life of the region when they 
take advantage of employment, retail, cultural, and entertainment 
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opportunities in neighboring suburbs or in New York City. What is 
needed, then, is perhaps not a wholesale reorganization of local 
government, but a mutual learning in which the city becomes more like 
the suburbs while the suburbs become more like the city. 
Thus, Schwartz’s (2001) call for the localization of power in New 
York City is just the flip side of Long Island Index’s call for consolidation 
of government units within Long Island (Center for Survey Research 
2007, Center for Governmental Research 2007). New York City 
residents already choose neighborhoods based on desired features 
(the New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey regularly asks 
householders their reason for leaving their previous neighborhood). 
The City does not have to split into a thousand small municipalities to 
take advantage of a Tiebout-type efficiency, or to increase citizen 
participation in oversight and governance. Conversely, Nassau County 
does not have to join itself to New York City to participate in regional 
planning or to take advantage of economies of scale. And both New 
York City and Nassau County could benefit from the congruence of 
administrative and jurisdictional boundaries. Here the negative results 
of Chapter 4 are useful, as this policy can be recommended with some 
evidence that conterminous borders will not exacerbate the 
segregation and spatial inequality that remains the biggest challenge 
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to the Tiebout model. 
There might be some efficiency losses if various public services 
have widely divergent optimum sizes, but the benefits in terms of 
citizen oversight and participation in governance might well be worth 
having some public services organized at other than their optimum 
size. Moreover, many “horizontally integrated” public services—
services like fire protection and police protection which must be 
produced in “plants” dispersed throughout the landscape—appear to 
have essentially flat cost curves (no economies or diseconomies of 
scale) over a wide range of outputs (Hirsch 1968). Thus, there may in 
practice be no production cost tradeoff to requiring common 
jurisdictional boundaries for such services. But in arguing for the 
usefulness of a Tiebout-type localism, some restriction as to the lower 
size of a municipality (or central city administrative district) seems 
necessary. The small average size of municipalities in Long Island and 
New Jersey have repeatedly been suggested as a major factor in the 
high property tax burdens of these areas (Center for Governmental 
Research 2007). Yet a recent New Jersey state-level push toward 
consolidation of small municipalities has met resistance from local 
governments and their residents (Pérez-Peña 2010). New York’s new 
governor has similarly called for local consolidation as a cost-saving 
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measure. It remains to be seen whether New York might have more 
success in this endeavor than New Jersey. 
Resistance to the Tiebout model grows primarily out of concern for 
racial segregation and spatial inequality. To evaluate possible policies 
for dealing with this inequality, we must apply the justice perspective 
developed in Chapter 2 and in the last section. Recall that Rawls 
proposed an exchange branch of government (with its own legislature) 
that would use benefit taxation to provide services targeted to people 
who demand them. Given the nonexcludable nature of many public 
goods (but not, it should be noted, education), it is difficult to imagine 
what such services could be other than those whose benefits attenuate 
rapidly with distance, i.e., local public goods. I therefore proposed that 
a Tiebout-type localism could fulfill the function of the exchange 
branch. But in Rawls’ theory, the demands of justice must be satisfied 
prior to any allocation by the exchange branch. Goods which are 
fundamental to distributive justice, such as education, should not be 
allocated via the exchange branch. 
If local governments are to fulfill the role of the exchange branch, 
does this mean that education must be provided by a higher level of 
government? Since I have conceived of the exchange branch as being 
part of a two-scale system instead of the two-stage system proposed 
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by Rawls, I am not proposing that local governments must be 
restricted to this exchange branch role. (In Rawls’ two-stage system, 
the exchange branch legislature must be restricted to deliberating 
temporally after any distribution-impacting services have been 
provided for.) Local governments would continue to function, as they 
currently do, primarily as an allocation branch. But if they are also to 
provide public goods such as education which are heavily implicated in 
distributive justice, financing must be arranged so as to satisfy the 
demands of the spatialized difference principle: the financing system 
must be the one, out of all possible systems, which provides the 
greatest benefit to the least well off; and the locational advantages 
and disadvantages must be shared. 
To satisfy the demands of the spatialized difference principle, we do 
not need consolidated metropolitan school districts (a proposal for 
which I am unaware of any proponents), but we do need to transfer 
resources from the wealthier to the poorer districts. This policy is 
consistent with Schwab and Oates’ welfare economics analysis of the 
Tiebout model, which found increased efficiency (not just equity) in 
intergovernmental transfers, and also found that if additional funding 
were portable with disadvantaged students, this would provide an 
incentive for wealthier communities to accept some proportion of 
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disadvantaged students so as to reduce their tax export (Schwab, 
Oates 1991). The policy is also consistent with modern American 
jurisprudence, which in many states has been receptive to fiscal equity 
challenges to the structure of educational finance. Fiscal equity 
campaigns have generally proceeded via lawsuit at the state level, as 
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez (1973) 
determined that school tax base inequality was not a federal issue 
(although Milliken v. Brady II (1977) explicitly allowed states to pursue 
their own tax base sharing plans). Legal successes in the courts have 
not always translated to policy implementation. Although Vermont’s 
legislature passed Act 60, implementing a school district property tax 
sharing pool, for the school year immediately following Amanda 
Brigham v. State of Vermont (1997), in New Jersey (Abbot v. Burke) 
and New York (Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State) court decisions 
have been met with footdragging by the legislatures and subsequent 
relitigation (New Jersey’s Abbot v. Burke has seen 20 NJ Supreme Court 
decisions between 1985 and 2009).
The kind of tax base sharing enacted in Vermont inevitably brings 
us to discuss the most significant source of local public revenue, the 
property tax. The property tax is well-liked by public finance 
economists for several reasons, including its transparency; the 
148
Chapter 5
immovability of the tax base (making it a better source of autonomous 
local revenue than income or sales taxes, which are more easily 
avoided); and the recapture of community-created property value 
(Youngman 2002). In spite of this, it is perhaps the most unpopular of 
taxes, its transparency being one of the features which causes it to 
draw so much ire. While property taxes are widely viewed as 
regressive, this view has not held currency in public finance economics 
for 35 years (Aaron 1975, Oates 1999). (Of interest, although I cannot 
address it here, is the fact that the left persists in the belief that 
property tax is regressive. Doubtless the lack of a committed 
opposition from the left has something to do with the success of 
property tax limitation measures proposed and financed by 
conservative organizations.) 
In theory, the transfer of property taxes out of the local jurisdiction 
should be capitalized into lower housing prices. This would be 
beneficial in one of two ways. First, it would work directly to reduce the 
differential in housing prices in high tax base and low tax base 
jurisdictions, which itself would promote economic integration. Second, 
to the extent that housing prices remain high Sin the high tax base 
area, the residents would in essence be paying for their exclusivity. 




Rawlsian considerations point strongly toward the conclusion that 
educational funding should be structured so as to equalize not inputs 
but outcomes. This could involve intergovernmental grants, as I have 
discussed, or moving the entire funding system or even control to 
higher level of government. Considerable control of education by the 
states is already in effect, leading some to argue that local control of 
education is more myth than reality, and that state and U.S. Supreme 
Court decisions which justify local finance in terms a desired value of 
local control are suspect (Shelley 1994). Against this stands work by 
Hoxby, finding higher productivity (in terms of a measure of outcome 
success per dollar spent) among smaller districts, and Fischel’s 
important argument that geographically defined school districts 
provide benefits in terms of social capital that lead to greater citizen 
involvement in local governance (Hoxby 2000, Fischel 2009). 
Considering that educational performance among OECD countries 
seems to be essentially uncorrelated with whether education is 
financed at a national, local, or (in some federal systems) state level 
(Fisher 1996: 503), it would probably be unwise to make too strong of 
a case for organizing education at any particular level. Since a 
wholesale transfer of educational finance to the state (or even federal) 
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level is politically unlikely, a tax base sharing or equalization program 
is both politically expedient and preserves the argued benefits of local 
control. 
This equalization with regard to need can be pursued in different 
ways. Vermont collects school property taxes at a uniform rate at the 
state level, then disburses the revenue to the school districts. Local 
school districts may increase their own taxes to add to this foundation 
funding, but must contribute part of the revenue they raise to a 
sharing pool that is distributed to other school districts. By comparison, 
New York State's response to the Campaign for Fiscal Equity decision is 
to provide additional funding to the New York City schools ($359 
million in the 2008-09 school year) out of general revenue, which 
means that it is mostly paid out of state income taxes and partially 
includes money collected from New York City residents. This may result 
in improvements in New York City education, but it is not exactly tax 
base sharing. Further undermining any equalizing intent of the law, a 
voting bloc of Long Island Republicans in the New York State 
legislature have made sure that the state aid funding formula includes 
a fixed proportion of state education aid for Long Island, including 




In a hostile political environment, policies to address metropolitan 
inequality could also be promoted via private organizations. Yaro (Yaro 
2000) discusses the century-plus role of Regional Plan Association as a 
planning research and advocacy group. A variety of metopolitan-level 
issues, such as housing integration, school integration, a broader 
geographic tax base in school funding, a just distribution of 
metropolitan resources, and housing choice within the constraints of 
planning and justice could be promoted privately by a metropolitan-
wide organization which had aspects of a regional land trust, a 
planning organization, a real estate investment trust (REIT), and a 
community development corporation (CDC). Regional land trusts were 
first described by Swann in 1972 in a document which also introduced 
the community land trust (CLT). While CLTs have primarily been used 
as an affordable housing solution, Swann envisioned the regional land 
trust leasing land to local agencies and CDCs, either directly or via 
CLTs, in order to promote local economic growth and to provide a 
community voice in land use decisions. I would suggest that the 
regional land trust manage some of its land for profit, leasing to local 
industry and higher-income residents. The profit would then be used to 
(a) acquire more property; (b) subsidize geographically widespread CLT 
affordable housing projects including advocating for affordable housing 
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in currently exclusive communities; and (c) implement a form of tax 
base sharing by transferring funds from high-tax-base/low-need 
jurisdictions to low-tax-base/high-need jurisdictions within the 
metropolitan area. By managing some its property for profit, the 
regional land trust would be operating similarly to a REIT, but 
dividends would fund education in high-need school districts, 
affordable housing projects, and other needs in disadvantaged 
jurisdictions. The income stream would give the regional land trust a 
natural growth rate independent of philanthropic and government 
largesse. 
5.4 Future Research
I began the research for this dissertation with an idea that the 
Tiebout model can incongruously serve to support democratic localism, 
but also serve as an apologia for persistent spatial inequality. I was 
unsure where the investigation would take me. Two empirical studies 
produced results which were unexpected. First, based on the existing 
literature, I expected a clear finding of income sorting across school 
districts, but the magnitude of the effect was weak and the finding was 
not robust to alternate measures of inequality. Instead I found that 
income sorting is very important at the municipal level, while school 
district sorting is dominated by race (this latter finding consistent with 
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the existing literature on school choice). This result in turn suggested 
that income and racial sorting might be mutually reinforcing in regions 
where municipal and school district borders are coterminous, but this 
hypothesis was decisively rejected. 
These empirical findings cannot alone determine our attitude 
toward the Tiebout model. I therefore began with a discussion of 
spatial justice in the urban system. I argued that distributive justice 
must take locational advantages into account, and this includes the 
social and economic advantages of wealth and exclusivity. While a 
number of policies might contribute to a more just distribution of 
locational advantages, I focused on intergovernmental transfers. I 
found transfers to be consistent with a welfare economics analysis of 
the Tiebout model, as well as with the legal successes of fiscal equity 
lawsuits in several states. Since local government finance can be 
modified so as to achieve a more just distribution, it is not necessary to 
insist upon regional governance, though some consolidation of 
extremely small suburban municipalities might be sensible. 
A number of questions remain. While the empirical method 
developed to investigate household fiscal sorting is promising, it needs 
work. In particular, the low explanatory power of the models must be 
investigated, or new methods need to be developed. The current 
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method relies merely on the presence of a jurisdictional border for 
several explanatory variables. Perhaps a measure of service quality 
(e.g. school test score differentials) could be used instead. The current 
investigation used data from the 2000 Census. The release of 2010 
data is imminent, so the method could be applied to newer data, and 
older data as well. A change over time approach could be used, where 
the dependent variable would be change in income heterogeneity. 
Further applications of the method could include more 
administrative districts within New York City (or another central city). 
In particular, New York City high school attendance zones could be 
investigated, and their influence on residential sorting compared 
suburban school districts. (Alesina, Baqir & Hoxby 2004 find some 
evidence of ethnic sorting at the level of school attendance zones but 
no evidence of racial sorting.) New York City could also be investigated 
as a “school choice” city. In the largest school district in the country, 
secondary school students may request to attend any high school in 
the city, although they are only guaranteed a seat in their zoned 
school. Given the logic of the Tiebout model, such a system would 
dampen the motivational force of this aspect of the residential location 
decision. Taking into account how many students are actually able to 
take advantage of choice in this system, it would be interesting to 
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investigate how overall residential sorting compares to other urban 
school systems.
In framing the justice discussion, I had to leave off some questions 
regarding processes of suburbanization, including assuming a fiscal 
sorting aspect to white flight. This bears further investigation, 
particularly as to the relationship between fragmentation and 
suburbanization. If a Tiebout landscape of small municipalities is more 
efficient and offers more consumer choice, suburbanization may have 
happened more quickly in landscapes which were already more 
fragmented or which had relatively permissive laws regarding 
municipal incorporation. 
I began this dissertation discussing the lack of dialogue between the 
Tiebout literature and the residential location literature. My empirical 
chapters provide support for the view that Tiebout choice is a factor in 
household location. Additional work is needed to quantify the relative 
importance of this factor compared with other factors, such as 
proximity to employment and social networks. 
Finally, writings on spatial justice or the just city have increased 
dramatically in recent years. What empirical analyses are undertaken 
should partially be determined by the pressing needs of those who 
may be shut out of access to good education and safe environments by 
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the current balkanized urban landscape. The spatialized Rawlsian 
perspective must be applied to these and other urban issues, and 
critiqued with respect to its usefulness in engaging urban issues. As 
the population of the world becomes more and more urban, ideas for 
evaluating and achieving justice in urban environments will become 
tantamount to pursuing justice for the world.
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